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ABSTRACT

This collection of conference papers addresses selected philosophical and social questions being faced by contemporary educators. Papers and presenters are: "The Computer Revolution, the Technological Fallacy, and Education" (Keith L. Raitz); "Some Bits and Bytes: A Response to Raitz" (Robert J. Skovira); "The Public School's Search for a Public" (Harry S. Broudy); "The Theory and Practice of Just Community in Schools" (Patrick Socoski); "Moral Principles in Education: A Reevaluation" (Jo Ann Freiberg); "Competition and Moral Development" (Barbara S. Stengel); "Competing Cultural Ideals for the School: Liberal Education and Multicultural Education" (Timothy Reagan); "Dewey's Theory of Inquiry: Problems of Foundations" (Gabriele Lakomski); and "The Premises of Four Moral Conceptions: Classical, Modern, Totalitarian, and Utopian" (Raymond Wilkie). Minutes of the business meeting, the financial statement, and the 1982-83 membership list of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society are also included. (RM)

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INTRODUCTION

Robert J. Skovira
Robert Morris College

Another year has passed, another meeting; and, once again, this edition of Philosophical Studies in Education serves as the forum for our attempt at comprehending new and old signs and their relationships. Thus, the function of this brief introduction is to point to some of the signs and relationships. There are plenty of both left over to be discovered or created by the readers of this volume.

Professor Broudy, in an invited paper, indicates that the ideology of Cultural Pluralism (CP) has provided many opportunities for the philosopher of education to contribute to educational theory. Practicing what he preaches, Professor Broudy begins an inquiry into the purpose of the public school and its place in the scheme of things. When the accepted ideology maintained a perception of a unified society and, thus, a singular public good, the goals and very nature of the public's schools were clear. CP, with its educational persona, multicultural education, has muddled educators' vision of the world. As an ideology, CP forces a perception of multiple publics (at least five official ones) and competing public goods. The schools and their curricula are in disarray, and lack any sense of unity of purpose; hence, there is a quest for unity if not for certainty. The puzzles facing the public schools need to be clarified and, if possible, resolved. The educational philosopher is in the best position to initiate the process of inquiry into the value of the public school. Thus, does Professor Broudy discusses one of his favorite topics: the role of the philosopher of education in contemporary circumstances.

In this presidential address, Raitz turns our attention to the "computer revolution." Comparing it to the Industrial Revolution, he discusses the problem of using the concept of "computer revolution" to predict how society and education may change. For some, such as Seymour Papert, it is not a question of whether the society and culture will change or not, but in what direction and to what end. Addressing critically the computer's value for learning and teaching, Raitz writes about artificial intelligence and sources of enthusiasm. He focuses upon what he calls the "technological fallacy." That is, if the use of a machine or a procedure is technologically feasible, then it is a moral good to utilize it. Dusting off McClellan's argument for the value of teaching machines, Raitz extends the argument to cover computers and open the door to valuable inquiry about the need of a new epistemology.

According to Reagan, the relationship between multicultural education and the Peters-Hirst ideal of an "educated person" poses a problem for schools today (one of Professor Broudy's puzzles). Liberal education, with its goal of developing the well-rounded person, has been undermined by the ideology of CP. Reagan focuses on the issues confronting the schools and their curricula when they are forced to deal not with one culture but with a plurality of

cultures. The educational configurations now present in society are bewildering. The development of a common paideia is a complex task. The ideal of the educated individual appears to be meaningless in a multicultural society. Suggesting that we are actually dealing with two different types of goals, Reagan proposes that multicultural education is a process-oriented objective and the educated person is a product-oriented objective. The relation he argues for is that multicultural education as a process goal of the schools can support the traditional goal of producing "educated persons."

Lakomski, in her paper, discusses Dewey's theory of inquiry in relation to his conception of naturalism. Dewey's theory of inquiry situates human knowing in a sociocultural environing world. Our perception of issues and problems depend upon our circumstances. What we see as the facts and consequences of a situation is determined by the sociocultural structures of the situation. Hence, growth or change is a matter of mutual adaptation. The situation is changed and, since we are part of it, we change. In conjunction with his theory of inquiry, Lakomski argues that Dewey's theory of naturalism establishes that our circumstances inform our descriptions and explanations of reality in response to situationally defined problems. She argues that Dewey's natuaralism turns metaphysical as he attempts to serve two masters: Locke and Hegel. Lakomski outlines, finally, a relationship between Dewey's theories of inquiry and naturalism and the analysis and comprehension of social policy.

The essay by Freiberg deals with the misrepresentation of Dewey's theory of moral education by two opposing contemporary views: the Cognitive Development model and the Values Clarification model. Freiberg argues that, for Dewey, the function of moral theory is to discover the principles for the decision-making process. She points out that since the two different programs misinterpret Dewey's ideas on moral education, neither approach can be related validly to Dewey's principles of moral theory.

Socoski examines issues of importance to the just community perspective and to the goal of developing democratic decision-making procedures. He discusses how the cognitive development model can be used as a guide for moving people and groups in decisional conflict toward "sociomoral growth." Socoski argues that in the just community model consensus can come out of conflict since the model forces a comprehension of democratic principles underlying the decision-making process.

In his review of McIntyre's After Virtue, Wilkie discusses two conceptions that are, he believes, basic to moral theory and educational philosophy in today's rationalized society. These are derived from three basic configurations: the Aristotelian approach to ethical theory, the Enlightenment view of morality as rationalistic and secularistic and the perception of disorder and confusion in moral language and action. The first idea is that the Aristotelian view of the individual's and society's nature and their relationship is a valid conception of things, although it must be further strengthened by a utilization of sociological principles and laws.

The other concept is that modern moral theories are invalid because they are based on the idea that the individual exists before and separate from society. Wilkie moves to a discussion of MacIntyre's defining propositions of the Traditional and Modern ethical perspectives. These premises are (as Wilkie presents them): (a) prior existence of community, (b) prior existence of the individual, (c) the pluralistic and relativistic nature of values, and (d) monism and objective values. Subsequently, he includes, in a clarifying effort, two Buberian propositions: the I-Thou and I-It premises. Wilkie concludes his decomposition of the fundamental arguments in After Virtue by highlighting the relations among the six components of a model of moral theory.

Framing her discussion with Gilligan's conflict with Kohlberg and Piaget about female and male constructs of moral development, Stengel writes about Piaget's concept of competition and its function in moral development. The idea of competition highlights the controversy surrounding the theory and nature of moral growth. According to Piaget, participation in competitive situations seems to be a necessary part of moral growth as well as a hindrance. Competitive environments can enforce relation-driven or rule-driven behavior; as a result, the nature of moral development is in doubt. Stengel discusses the contradictions arising from Piaget's indecisiveness on the matter and the implications in relation to relationship-driven and rule-driven moral theory and behavior. She indicates that, while some problems are not cleared up, the contradictions are clarified when Piaget's theoretical grounds are taken into account. The upshot is that Stengel's philosophical inquiry bolsters Gilligan's empirical findings about morality perceived as rule-directed behavior or as relationship-preserving behavior.

In conclusion, this introductory essay has suggested some perceived configurations of signs of theoretical issues and their relationships. In light of Professor Broudy's suggested role of the philosopher of education, it seems to me that our descriptions of things educational should be subsumed to our reflective inquiry for the purpose of understanding our circumstances. And, this edition represents, as usual, our attempt to fulfill the expectations of us as philosophers of education.

THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION, THE TECHNOLOGICAL FALLACY, AND EDUCATION

Keith L. Raitz
University of Louisville

Introduction

Several months ago, I asked ERIC, through a translator, to tell me how many journal articles and technical reports had been written about computers in education. He quickly searched his memory and replied that he knew of 4127. Then I asked him how many had been written in the past ten years about computers in relation to learning and theories, and he told me he knew of sixty. He promised to send me abstracts of these works, and, true to his word, the next day he mailed the sixty abstracts to me from his home in Latham, New York. Since that encounter with ERIC, I have read many of the works he told me about, and I have found several others of which he apparently had no knowledge, even though they were written during the ten-year period in question and are about computers in relation to learning and theories. Furthermore, I discovered many other relevant works of which I am sure ERIC has no recollection; for they were written many years ago by people, such as David Hume and Gilbert Ryle, with whom ERIC is not acquainted, I suppose. To be fair to ERIC, these people did not use the word "computer"; nevertheless, their works are relevant to my inquiry. I inferred from the results of my research that ERIC's memory is both short and selective, which is to say, of course, that he is only human.

Meeting ERIC was my first face-to-interface encounter with the Information Explosion, the Electronic Age, and the Computer Revolution. I came to study computers through the back door, so to speak. Starting with an interest in philosophical psychology, I began to explore the computational models used by some cognitive psychologists, a study which led me directly to the field of artificial intelligence, or AI, for short. The AI people have burdened themselves with an ill-chosen label for their discipline and have been dubbed the "artificial intelligensia" by some of their more vitriolic critics; but some AI researchers, most notably, Seymour Papert, have been engaged in inquiry that seems to be important for education and worthy of attention by educational philosophers.

In this paper, however, I do not take up the central issues of artificial intelligence; rather, I follow an interest which developed from my reading in the literature of AI and, more generally, in the literature concerning the computer revolution, concentrating on whatever predictive power this notion might possess. Second, I explore the sources of enthusiasm for computers and for optimism regarding their use. Third, I try to expose "the technological fallacy" found in arguments of computer enthusiasts. This fallacy, which might also be called the argument from optimism, is the attempt to derive "ought" from "can do." It may overstate the case to call the technological fallacy typical of the literature concerning the computer revolution in

education, but I believe it is widespread enough to cause concern. In the final section of the paper, I dust off an argument made twenty years ago by James McClellan as he attempted to justify the use of teaching machines in the schools. I modernize the argument and claim that arguments like McClellan's are needed if educators are to avoid the technological fallacy and if they are to avoid also the enthusiastic promotion of the computer revolution in lieu of sound arguments to justify the use of computers. It should go without saying that my views are not opposed to the use of computers in education. In fact, I would say I have bridled enthusiasm for computers and their possible contribution to education. Concerning the computer revolution, I would say, borrowing a line from Shakespeare, "Heere's fine Revolution, if we had the tricke to see't."

In Search of the Computer Revolution

Seeing the computer revolution is no easy trick, which might seem odd, for, according to some writers, we are well into it. The revolution started in 1946 when the first electronic digital computer (ENIAC) was constructed at the University of Pennsylvania. Or did it begin some years later, in 1951, when UNIVAC I became commercially available and was used by the Census Bureau? Maybe it started with the invention of the transistor in the mid-1950s, or with the techniques, worked out some ten years ago, of etching integrated circuits on silicon chips. First the transistor and then the chip were steps toward the miniaturization required to bring us the micro-processor, which perhaps represents the real beginning of the computer revolution. (I heard recently that someone had discovered a molecule possessing properties which might make it the successor of the silicon chip.) But wait a minute. Why should our view be myopic? There were computers before there were electronic computers. It is difficult to identify the earliest computer, but historians of technology come very close to bestowing that honor on the Difference Machine or the Analytic Engine conceived but never completed by Charles Babbage in the middle of the nineteenth century. Historians who take a longer view might point to Pascal's design for a calculator or even to the analog devices actually constructed and used by the ancient Greeks to keep track of celestial bodies. A wider view would go beyond Western civilization, e.g., to Arabic devices or the abacus.

Of course, to pinpoint the beginning of the computer revolution one needs a precise definition of "computer," one which will allow a useful distinction between the "seeds" of the computer revolution, on the one hand, and the beginning of the revolution itself, on the other. Moreover, one needs a clear idea of the meaning of "revolution." Now, the hallmark of revolution, in the sense relevant here, is change: not mere change, but change with an appropriate adjective, viz., drastic, radical, or fundamental change. Proclaimers of the computer revolution who say merely that it will change our lives or that our lives will never be the same are not saying very much, for they invite comparison with the indoor-plumbing revolution, the air-conditioning revolution, and the fast-food revolution. All of these, especially indoor plumbing,

have changed our lives, perhaps even drastically in some senses; but they are not the stuff that revolutions are made of. Revolutionary change must not only change our lives; it must change the conditions of life, e.g., by sweeping away social institutions, erecting new ones, and/or changing fundamentally those that survive. The Industrial Revolution, which provides one model for accounts of the computer revolution, swept away the monarchy, erected a new economic order, and fundamentally changed ideas and practices of education. Change of a similar order may await us in the computer age, the process of change may already have begun, but it cannot yet be characterized as revolutionary in this broad sense without arousing controversy.

Not everyone who speaks of the computer revolution has the Industrial Revolution explicitly in mind as a model, although many do. As is the case with the machine of the Industrial Revolution, the computer is commonly used as a symbol of vast technological change which is believed to have significance of a fundamental nature for all social institutions. Thus, "computer revolution" is ambiguous, sometimes being used to refer to the electronic revolution, the information revolution, or the technological revolution, to mention some of the most common uses. As a symbol of the information explosion, the computer is compared to other technological developments, such as movable type, which have "exploded information" in the past. As a symbol of modern electronic technology, the computer is identified as the most noteworthy contributor to developments in communication media, automation, management information systems, and the like. Here, use of the word "revolution" is least likely to arouse objection, incidentally, if its use is confined to describing changes within business and industry. Whether commercial applications of the new technology will result in fundamental social change is still an open question, however. That is, the effects of such applications may prove to be socially conservative rather than revolutionary. Still other people who speak of "the computer revolution" use it as a slogan to exhort others to action. Despite this variety of uses, it seems clear that most and perhaps all who use the phrase have in mind, at least vaguely, some notion of social change which has the general features of the change wrought by the Industrial Revolution. Futhermore, they use the notion of a computer revolution, first to predict, anticipate, or suggest the shape of the future and, second, to suggest or prescribe actions to be taken in preparation for the future. It seems appropriate, therefore, to examine the "predictive power" of notions of the computer revolution.

Predicting the nature and scope of change will prove difficult indeed. Consider the Industrial Revolution. It is an invention of historians, an explanatory idea conceived after the events it is used to explain, an artifact of inquiry trying to make sense of and extract meaning from a hundred years or more of human experience. But some historians reject the use of "revolution" in accounting for that experience. In The Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850, H. L. Beales notes one historian's objection:

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> As Unwin put it: "When, on looking back, we find that the revolution has been going on for two centuries, and had been in preparation for two centuries before that . . ., we may begin to doubt whether the term Industrial Revolution . . . has not by this time served its turn."[2]

"Yet," Beales goes on to say, "one must admit that the age of Doctor Johnson did perish." "It may be true that each particular aspect" of the revolution, "when examined under the statistician's microscope, shows as a change not of kind but degree. But the sum of these changes was overwhelming: and the process of adding sum to sum, like the process of compound interest, amounted to a revolution."[3] So Beales accepts the term "Industrial Revolution" for what it is worth. However, in the preface to the first edition of his book (1928), he quotes from Tristram Shandy: "The reader will be content to wait for a full explanation of these matters till the next year--when a series of things will be laid open which he little expects."[4] In the introduction to the new edition (1958), he lets the same quotation stand as "a necessary forward" for any book on the Industrial Revolution.[5]

What can be said of the computer revolution based upon analogy with the Industrial Revolution? Generally speaking, when an analogy is used as an argument and when it is drawn between two terms, IR and CR, it is based on similarities known to exist between IR and CR, similar properties P_1, P_2, P_3, . . . P_n. An additional property, P_x, which is known to be a property of IR but not known to be a property of CR, is inferred to be possessed by CR. Such an analogy may be judged strong to the extent that (1) there exist many similar and few dissimilar properties shared by IR and CR; (2) the possession of similar properties, P_1, P_2, P_3, . . . P_n, is relevant to the possession of the inferred property, P_x, is empirically testable. Is there a strong argument by analogy to be made between the Industrial Revolution and the computer revolution? I am not aware that anyone has succeeded in doing so or that anyone has made a rigorous attempt, but my lack of awareness may result from my limited familiarity with the literature. I do not believe a strong argument can be constructed, primarily because a detailed examination of the two revolutions reveals too few similarities in relation to the dissimilarities and because of problems of relevance. However, I am not going to argue that position here. Instead, I want to focus on the "predictive power" or "anticipatory utility" of the conclusions such arguments might yield.

To begin with, we should note that the conclusions of the IR-CR analogical arguments may be confirmed by empirical means; they may also be falsifiable, provided they are sufficiently clear and they include a date. I am thinking of conclusions having the form, "Such-and-such a state of affairs will exist in year so-and-so." It seems, however, that, if arguments supporting a conclusion of this type are relatively strong, which is to say, if the arguments are quite general, then the conclusion is next to useless as a prediction or anticipation of the future. Although such arguments are never strong, some are stronger than others. For example, an argument might be

constructed based on general IR-CR similarities involving technology: the development of new technology, the feasibility of its large-scale use, the existence of social conditions providing impetus to use the technology, to mention a few that come easily to mind. From these similarities and others that could be adduced, it may be inferred that, because the Industrial Revolution brought about fundamental social change, therefore the computer revolution will also bring about fundamental social change. Now this conclusion has some interest, but its generality makes it next to useless, especially for those who point to the computer revolution as a reason to prepare for the changes it will cause. What are we to prepare for? Fundamental social change, yes, but what will be the nature of such change, aside from its being fundamental? If the analogy is used to draw a more specific conclusion that a particular social function (say, education) will undergo radical change, it is still an open question what it will be like after the revolution. The argument will not yield conclusions specific enough to be useful. Moreover, it seems likely that greater and greater specificity will lead to nonsense: e.g., the inference that, inasmuch as the Industrial Revolution brought about the need for public schooling in the United States, the computer revolution will do the same. To sum up: the stronger the IR-CR argument by analogy, the more useless its conclusion to predict the nature of social change; as the conclusions gain in specificity needed for predictive utility, they tend toward nonsense.

Additional problems relating to its utility and predictive power arise from the unclarity of "the computer revolution." As I have already mentioned, the computer as symbol is often the focus of writers who call attention to the likely effects of modern technology. Focusing narrowly on the computer or even more broadly on technology can be misleading in rather obvious ways. Technology is not to be viewed and usually is not viewed as being somehow apart from the intricate web of explanation that will account for social change. Although, with some justification, the computer, symbolizing technology, may be thought to be the most noteworthy single precipitator of change, it is not as if it were dropped from heaven or as if it will somehow work its magic on our lives apart from other things which have been or are now abroad in the world. That is, any technological revolution will not run along on its own, so to speak, as if it were a train on a track pointed dead ahead, anymore than did the machines that symbolize the Industrial Revolution. For this reason, predicting the course of the technological revolution will be relatively difficult, depending on how distant the prediction. For long-range purposes, the predictive power of notions of the computer revolution is practically nil. Imagine someone surveying the machines being used increasingly in his eighteenth century and, with little additional evidence, predicting the course of the Industrial Revolution. Current predictions of the course of the computer revolution are seldom accompanied with dates to indicate when they will be realized, so it is difficult to assess their likelihood. But if we want to probe very far into the future, science fiction will probably serve us better.

What about short-range predictions and anticipations? Here, too, there is little reason to believe that notions of the computer revolution provide much reliable guidance. For one thing, even short-range predictions of the effects of new technology are notoriously errant. As one example, some of you may remember when television was predicted to bring the best drama, music, and dance into the American livingroom, thereby raising standards of taste and culture throughout the land.[6] Another reason for being skeptical even of short-range predictions deriving from notions of the computer revolution is provided by Harold Shane in "The Silicon Age and Education." He asks ". . . why such an astute observer as Alvin Toffler failed to mention the microprocessor in Future Shock."[7] It is simple, says Shane. "The microprocessor didn't even exist in 1970!" Having noted this difficulty confronting even astute observers, Shane goes on to make three pages of predictions in the mode of Alvin Toffler, as Shane attempts "to anticipate the influence of the microchip and of telecommunications" on schooling, education, and learning.[8]

Continuing to note problems of unclarity as they bear on predictive utility, we should be aware that the words "drastic," "fundamental," "radical," and others used to characterize the likely effects of the computer revolution have meanings which are difficulty to pin down. Here, I do not intend much analysis of these words; but, if called upon to do so, I would be willing to defend the claim that they are vague in virtually every way words can be vague: i.e., there is no precise cut-off point between their proper and improper applications, there is not any single set of conditions governing their use, and there are no words used to define them which are not similarly vague.[9] It is true that we might be able to agree in many instances that these words are applicable to characterize the products, or results, of change. As the historian Beales points out, for example, "the age of Doctor Johnson did perish." We might agree that after the Industrial Revolution the economic conditions of life were radically changed; even so, the question of evolutionary versus revolutionary process would still be worth considering in the interest of clarity. Turning to the technological revolution, perhaps we could agree upon what would constitute fundamental change in the product sense. For example, if we were to find ourselves some years hence living in an Orwellian world where a totalitarian government employed technological means of thought control, it would certainly be fundamentally different from our current existence; but, assuming the change did not occur overnight, say, as the result of political revolution, the question of evolutionary versus revolutionary development remains. It is possible, of course, that a computer revolution of some sort will bring about change that is both swift and fundamental, but, in that case, its predictability and our opportunity to prepare for it are in doubt.

The Sources of Enthusiasm for Computers

I tried to show in the previous section that notions of the computer revolution are ambiguous, that they are extremely and essentially vague, and that they are all but devoid of predictive utility. For these reasons alone,

it is troubling that "the computer revolution" is invoked by writers in educational literature as part of the rationale or justification for proposals involving educational policy and practice. It is disturbing also that these proposals, lacking a sound rational basis, go hand in hand with enthusiastic optimism concerning computers and the educational benefits which, it is alleged, will accrue from their use. The combination of fuzzy or empty notions and their emotional advocacy is not new in education, especially when some new technology is being touted. But, in its extent and intensity, the current enthusiasm for computers certainly rivals and probably surpasses anything that has gone before. The only thing in recent memory that comes close is the enthusiasm generated for teaching machines about twenty-five years ago.

What are the sources of this enthusiasm for computers? For one thing, computers are wonderful machines, in the literal sense of "wonderful," and it is easy to "get hooked" on them. In its advanced stages, computer enthusiasm has symptoms comparable to those of drug addiction, e.g., the obsession and social isolation of so-called "computer hacks."[10] In its early and intermediate stages, computer enthusiasm is manifested in and sustained by identifiable social behavior, which includes the use of a particular and, I might add, peculiar language. In short, we may be justified in speaking of a "computer culture" or "subculture" and, perhaps, of a "computer movement." Observers from outside the computer culture are in the habit of treating computer enthusiasts with a kind of bemused contempt, which surfaces more often in private conversations among the uninitiated than it does in discussions at which enthusiasts are present. No doubt such treatment does computer enthusiasts an injustice, but they might take solace in the fact that the smugness will disappear after the revolution.

If we turn from the field of education to artificial intelligence and computer science in hopes of finding dispassionate debate and rational consideration of the issues related to computers and their use, we are thoroughly disappointed. From its inception, the debate fairly crackles with anger and hostility. Bitter skeptics,[11] such as Mortimer Taube, Hubert Dreyfus, and Joseph Weizenbaum, scoff at the optimistic predictions of computerists, while maintaining that the programs of computer science and artificial intelligence are morally and intellectually bankrupt. The computerists respond in kind, with Marvin Minsky, Herbert Simon, and Seymour Papert taking refuge in the holy mysteries[12] of their calling while hurling ad hominems at the skeptics. The debate is often characterized, and aptly so, as one between skeptics and true believers with occasional converts being won to one side or the other. Computerists ask why the skeptics are so adamant and unreasonable in their opposition to the program of artificial intelligence and suggest that it is because the program threatens entrenched values and concepts involving the uniqueness of human beings. This may be true. At any rate, the computerists defend their enthusiastic optimism as a virtue, a necessary and desirable quality of searchers-after-the-truth, one which sustains inquiry and experiment in the face of failure, ridicule, and occasional self-doubt. This may also be true. The question is, when does enthusiasm serve the searcher at the expense of truth?

Another source of enthusiasm for computers is, perhaps, the most disturbing. It is the marketing of the computer revolution. That certain people and corporations stand to profit greatly from the widespread use of computer hardware and software is beyond question or doubt. And commercial interests have at their disposal the services of agencies which are in the business of generating enthusiasm and creating markets. While it is true that advertising agencies sometimes conduct market research to identify existing needs and desires of consumers, it is well known that they attempt also to create needs and desires where none exist, the better to sell their clients' wares. That is to say, advertising agencies reverse the cause-and-effect relation of the familiar maxim: they make invention the mother of necessity. One example is the current attempt to market the home computer, its development preceding any general consumer need for it.[13] Another example is the effort to populate the schools with computers, in part by generating enthusiasm for the computer revolution before the clear instructional and educational needs to be met by computers have been identified and agreed upon. After all, "revolution" is an advertising word (as in "revolutionary new hair spray"). It is not paranoia to suspect that the profit motive accounts for much of the talk of the computer revolution, and it is not contrary to our experience of contemporary advertising techniques to find enormous enthusiasm generated for ideas having little or no substance. Considering the potential for mischief in the marketing of the computer revolution, this source of enthusiasm for computers deserves much more attention than it gets from computer enthusiasts. In education, we face the prospect that decisions regarding goals, curricula, and methods will in effect be made by a marketing campaign. This is neither an idle concern nor a hypothetical problem. Last spring, the dean's office in the School of Education at the University of Louisville received one or two telephone calls each week for several weeks from schools and school districts asking the same general question: Our microcomputers were delivered yesterday (or will be delivered tomorrow); could you send someone out here to tell us what to do with them?

In this section, I have claimed that the enthusiasm of computerists is such that we may be justified in speaking of a computer culture or a computer movement. Not surprisingly, computer advocates invoke "the computer revolution" as a slogan to consolidate support and win converts. As I have noted, it is not likely that fuzzy ideas coupled with enthusiasm will lead to intelligent decision making in education, and the marketing of the computer revolution makes the problem especially disturbing. In the next section of the paper, I consider the technological fallacy, which, along with enthusiastic optimism, is commonly offered in place of sound arguments for educational practices.

The Technological Fallacy, or the Argument from Optimism

I said in my introduction that the essence of what I call "the technological fallacy" is the derivation of "ought" from "can do." It seems uncontroversial that "ought" cannot be inferred either deductively or inductively from

"can do" alone: that is, if all the premises of an argument are of the "can do" type, a conclusion of the "ought" type cannot be rationally inferred. In cases where such an inference is attempted, we are justified in pointing out that a premise of the proper normative type is required and that such a premise is implicit, or "suppressed," in the argument. The suppressed normative premise, one concerning the value of technological means and our obligation to use such means, is one feature of the technological fallacy. Being suppressed, of course, the normative premise goes unexamined. I suspect that enthusiasm for computers takes the place of critical examination of values and obligations and propels computer advocates over the logical gap between premises and conclusion. The second feature of the technological fallacy is conceptual. The argument contains an assertion that computers can do some human activity. Generally speaking, the argument reveals that its author overestimates the capabilities of computers while underestimating the complexity of human activities. I begin the discussion with an account of an experience of Joseph Weizenbaum, a computer scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

About twenty years ago, Weizenbaum designed a computer program which enabled a computer to "converse" in English with a human being. He called the program ELIZA because, like Shaw's Eliza of Pygmalion, it could be "taught" to speak increasingly well. In one experiment, Weizenbaum had ELIZA speak like a Rogerian psychotherapist, and ELIZA had an interesting conversation with a young woman playing the role of ELIZA's patient. In the following report of the therapy session, the young woman speaks first, and ELIZA's responses are written in capital letters:

Men are all alike.
IN WHAT WAY
They're always bugging us about something or other.
CAN YOU THINK OF A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE
Well, my boyfriend made me come here.
YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU COME HERE
He says I'm depressed much of the time.
I AM SORRY TO HEAR YOU ARE DEPRESSED
It's true. I am unhappy.
DO YOU THINK COMING HERE WILL HELP YOU NOT TO BE UNHAPPY
I need some help, that much seems certain.
WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO YOU IF YOU GOT SOME HELP
Perhaps I could learn to get along with my mother.
TELL ME MORE ABOUT YOUR FAMILY
My mother takes care of me.
WHO ELSE IN YOUR FAMILY TAKES CARE OF YOU
My father.
YOUR FATHER
You are like my father in some ways.
WHAT RESEMBLANCE DO YOU SEE
You are not very aggressive but I think you don't want me to notice that.
WHAT MAKES YOU THINK I AM NOT VERY AGGRESSIVE

You don't argue with me.
WHY DO YOU THINK I DON'T ARGUE WITH YOU
You are afraid of me.
DOES IT PLEASE YOU TO BELIEVE I AM AFRAID OF YOU
My father is afraid of everybody.
WHAT ELSE COMES TO MIND WHEN YOU THINK OF YOUR FATHER
Bullies.
DOES THAT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU COME HERE

Weizenbaum created ELIZA to demonstrate the information-processing power of a computer to people, such as some of the visitors at MIT, who did not possess specialized knowledge of computers. He had limited goals in mind. But, after he reported the results of the experiment in 1966 and 1967, he was profoundly shocked to discover that some practicing psychiatrists believed that ELIZA could be developed into a virtually complete computerized form of psychotherapy.[14]

One psychiatrist, confident that the program could be made ready for clinical use, saw ELIZA as a solution to the shortage of therapists. He suggested that "several hundred patients an hour could be handled by a computer system," leaving the human therapist's time to be used more efficiently than is is when psychotherapy is done on a one-to-one basis, i.e., a human-to-human basis.[15] Carl Sagan, writing some years later, said he could "imagine the development of a network of computer psychotherapeutic terminals, something like arrays of large telephone booths, in which, for a few dollars a session, we would be able to talk with an attentive, tested, and largely non-directive psychotherapist."[16]

Weizenbaum was shocked most by the psychiatrist, who seemed to believe that psychotherapy is reducible to a set of techniques and, further, that these techniques could be duplicated by a cleverly programmed computer. Weizenbaum had a different idea of psychotherapy, seeing it as the therapist's attempt to gain an empathetic understanding of a patient's emotional problems in order to help the patient learn to cope with them. Clearly, this idea did not square with that of the psychiatrist, who wrote that the "human therapist can be viewed as an information processor and a decision maker with a set of decision rules which are closely linked to short-range and long-range goals . . . He is guided . . . by rough empiric rules telling him what is appropriate to say and not to say in certain contexts."[17]

In its essentials, the psychiatrist's line of reasoning, which provides an example of the technological fallacy, is as follows:

P1: We can program computers to do psychotherapy.
P2: We can use computers to do psychotherapy in clinical settings.
P3: Computer technology provides the most efficient means of doing psychotherapy in clinical settings.

P4: (We are morally obligated to use the most efficient means available to maximize the good that results from psychotherapy).

C: Therefore, we ought to use computers to do psychotherapy in clinical settings.

The first premise asserts the possibility of duplicating a significant human activity, in this case psychotherapy, in a computer program; and P2 asserts the feasibility of its use, here in clinical settings. In some instances of the technological fallacy, it is claimed that the computer program and the necessary computer hardware exist; in other instances, such as in the argument above, it is claimed that the necessary program and hardware are possible in principle to design, although they do not presently exist. The third premise asserts efficiency of computer technology which exists or will exist. I will note in passing that claims that technology is possible, feasible, and efficient are often accepted uncritically by computer enthusiasts. The fourth premise of the argument is suppressed, although it seems to be implicit in the remarks of the psychiatrist who makes the argument. The implication is that the scarcity of psychotherapists in relation to the number of people who are in need of psychotherapy warrants the belief that we are morally obligated to develop and use technology which is possible and feasible in order to maximize the good that results from psychotherapy, viz., mental health. Carl Sagan's remarks about telephone booths suggest a means of distributing this good more widely, making it available outside clinical settings for a modest cost.

Again, the problem of the suppressed premise is that it often goes unexamined, which may suppress ethical debate as well. For example, making the premise explicit encourages its examination from different ethical perspectives; and, even if one accepts an ethical theory similar to the one implied in the argument, it is worthwhile to consider competing goods in relation to the limited resources available for their realization. But more important for my purposes is the point Weizenbaum makes. He believes computerized psychotherapy rests upon a mistaken conception of psychotherapy, a point which leads to the second feature of the technological fallacy. I return to the first premise of the argument. Is it possible to program computers to do psychotherapy? Any human activity may be duplicated in a computer program if and only if the activity is reducible to a set of rules or instructions which will enable a computer to perform the activity in all essential ways the same as a human being. So, for example, the fact that ELIZA requires a typewriter to communicate with patients does not count against the claim that we can program a computer to do psychotherapy. But, as Weizenbaum points out, the fact that ELIZA cannot gain an empathetic understanding of a patient's emotional problems is sufficient to falsify the claim that we can program computers to do psychotherapy. Here, I will not consider whether it is in principle possible to design a program to make a computer empathetic.[18] If one's view of psychotherapy is that it consists of information processing and decision making with a set of decision rules linked to short-range and long-range goals--and nothing more--then one sees only

technological difficulties in the way of computerized psychotherapy. This seems to be the case with the psychiatrist whose argument is being examined; however, because it excludes the distinctly human element of empathetic understanding, the information-processing view of psychotherapy represents an impoverished view of the activity. If we understand psychotherapy in its conventional meaning, then the first premise of the argument is false. Computers cannot be programmed to do psychotherapy, not even in principle. Space is not available here to get deeply into the debate concerning conceptual change or the criteria for choosing between competing concepts. I assume that, when a new meaning is offered which is significantly different from the ordinary, standard, or conventional meaning of a term, the burden of justification falls upon the innovator; and, further, that a claim that some human activity "may be viewed" in such-and-such a way, on the model of information processing or computer programming, hardly constitutes justification for viewing it that way. The technological fallacy involves the use of a computer model to characterize a particular human activity which, it is claimed, may be duplicated in a computer program. However, duplication is made possible only because the activity is conceived in terms of computer processes. When we consider the conventional conception of the activity, we realize that it is neither possible nor desirable to computerize it.

Justifying Computer Technology in Education

Advocates of computer technology in education are prone to commit the technological fallacy when their use of computer models leads them to misunderstand significant concepts such as teaching, learning, schooling, and education. It is difficult to describe briefly the opportunities for misadventure. However, one problem merits special attention, perhaps. There is a basic difference of opinion among computer advocates. On the one hand, there are those who believe computers will provide revolutionary new means to achieve the ends of schooling more effectively and efficiently. Although they may disagree about particular ends, they tend to select from a standard array, and they do not question seriously the desirability of schooling. On the other hand, some computer advocates believe computers will provide revolutionary new means to achieve revolutionary new ends, including the abolition of schooling in anything like its present form. Among members of both groups, one finds a clear preference for individualized instruction, a preference which is demonstrated in a standard litany: it is claimed that, although personal one-to-one contact between teacher and student is highly desirable, it almost never occurs in schools and is probably not feasible, and that the predominant situation is one in which the student must learn for himself in a classroom where the teacher aims at the middle level of comprehension.

> Those students who are respectively bored or mystified can find in computer-aided instruction an individualized curriculum, pitched at the exact level of difficulty which interaction with the computer has determined appropriate. It is humane . . . for a student to be in control of the learning process and to have individual abilities recognized and individual difficulties treated with infinite patience and without bias.[19]

What begins as computer-aided instruction, however, soon becomes the model for the whole of education. The new technology brings freedom

> . . . from the requirement that education must be offered at a set time and place. As students increasingly interact with teaching material outside of a classroom, through courseware available on cassette, floppy disc, videodisc, or by a link to a central computer, it will increasingly be the case that one-to-one instruction need not mean face-to-face.[20]

Continuing the scenario, one computer advocate in favor of de-schooling predicts "an explosion in the numbers of privately owned computers," which "are about to cross a power threshold" and, in so doing, provide "for the first time a viable alternative to schools and the possibility that education will once more become a private act."[21] "If . . . interaction with the computer can put the learner into contact with his most private self, it can also nurture in him an image of himself as an independent intellectual agent."[22]

Thus, we arrive at the technological equivalent of the view of education which has Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and the student on the other, except that the computer-interfacing model does not necessarily include any direct social interaction with another human being. Education is conceived as a private act. Seymour Papert, the author of this scenario, professes a sympathetic attitude toward Dewey, who proposed "to educate children in a spirit" that is "fundamentally correct but fails in practice for lack of a technological basis."[23] One wonders what Papert read wherein Dewey strips education of its social significance and wrenches it from the context of a community of shared values. It is interesting, I believe, that another author, who provides a similar scenario, seems to have at least an inkling of the social meaning of education. William Pritchard, in a fantasy which looks back on education from the year 2001, reports that,

> As technology bounded ahead, the role of teachers also changed dramatically. No longer were they primary disseminators of knowledge. The consoles in each home assumed that role. Teachers were trained instead in interpersonal skills, and children attended school to learn social graces.[24]

He is saddened by the evolution of schools because it suggests that people do not think well in groups. Pritchard's conception of education, although perhaps an improvement over Papert's, detaches intellectual from social activities and views the latter as aimed merely at learning social graces. Here, we see again that the computer-interfacing model provides an impoverished concept of education.

Now, supposing de-schooling is rejected as a desirable result of the computer revolution in education, how might computer technology be used in the schools to achieve worthwhile educational goals? How may the use of computers

be justified? One answer to this question is provided by James McClellan in "Automated Education: A Philosophical Approach," in which he defends the use of teaching machines in the schools.[23] I reconstruct his argument below, taking the liberty of bringing it up to date by substituting "computer technology" for "teaching machines" and using "programming" in the sense that applies to computers rather than teaching machines. In my discussion, I elaborate the detail of the argument, showing how McClellan avoids the technological fallacy and how the argument constitutes a better defense of computer technology than of teaching machines. Here is the argument:

P1: We can program computers to provide direct instruction to students.
P2: We can use computers to provide direct instruction to students in the schools.
P3: Computer technology provides the most efficient means of providing direct instruction to students in the schools.
P4: We are morally obligated to use the most efficient means available to maximize the good that results from providing direct instruction to students.

C: Therefore, we ought to use computers to provide direct instruction to students in the schools.

The first two premises assert the possibility and feasibility of using technology to provide direct instruction. Clearly, McClellan is talking about possibility in principle, for he sees much work to be done before the technology can actually be developed and used. McClellan assumes that behavioral psychology provides an adequate account of the principles of learning, i.e., an explanation of the causes of learning. However, he realizes that an adequate epistemology is not provided by behaviorism and will have to be worked out. This is because the concept of instruction implies that students not merely be caused to hold particular beliefs for the right reasons. In this way, McClellan seems to avoid the technological fallacy: i.e., he does not seem to accept the causal account of instruction as the entire account. It will not do to characterize instruction merely as the techniques involved in arranging the contingencies of reinforcement, for the causal, technical explanation will not capture the role of right reasons in instruction. According to McClellan, working out an adequate epistemology will require (1) an adequate conception of thinking, one which differentiates the types of thinking appropriate in the various disciplines and in the practical affairs of life; and (2) an adequate conception of subject matter, one which will help to clarify the nature of reasons for beliefs in the various disciplines. Furthermore, an adequate conception of unity in the curriculum is required, i.e., a purpose which will bring coherence to the school program. Such purpose not only provides the moral justification for subject-matter instruction but also the perspective from which to integrate such instruction into the total school program. Inasmuch as we are talking about technological means of instruction, the purpose also gives meaning and direction to the use of technology in the school. Finally, McClellan's behaviorism gets the better

of him, and he concludes that, through programmed instruction, it is possible to cause students to hold beliefs for the right reasons. The right reasons are to be built into the frames of the program and, one supposes, verbalizations of right reasons are to be reinforced. This position seems to collapse the distinction between causes and reasons, however, and to undermine McClellan's argument as a result. The modernization of his argument may provide a solution to this problem. Computer programs are vastly more subtle and flexible than the programs of teaching machines. If it is possible to design an instructional program for a teaching machine to provide reasons, it is quite likely that the same can be done for a computer. More thorough modernization would involve the use of computational psychology to replace the behavioral account of learning, provided the superiority of the computational explanation can be established. There is some reason to believe that it is more compatible with the epistemological conceptions McClellan calls for than is behaviorism.[26]

The normative premise (P4) in McClellan's argument is not a suppressed premise. Quite the contrary, it is constantly in the forefront of his consideration as the most important issue. The good which results from instruction is rationality, although it is not to be gained through direct instruction alone. It results from the entire school program, of which technological means of instruction are an integrated part. McClellan does not question the view that schooling should improve the quality of the student's life by providing the student with "sets of intellectual resources to be used by the student in meeting . . . real-life problems."[27] In the context of modern society, he says, this means giving students the intellectual and verbal skills necessary to "create meaning and order out of the complex, often chaotic, world in which he finds himself."[28] In order to be sure that "the basic morality of democratic and liberal education will be built into the programmed teaching for our youngsters," he recommends that every teacher and administrator develop the skills and attitudes of programming.[29] Even then, apparently, he saw the wisdom in grasping the means of production.

Conclusion

It seems to me that McClellan's argument deals with the essential issues of the use of new technology in education. There is no enthusiastic optimism concerning technology, although I believe I detect enthusiasm for the ideals of liberal education. In his article, claims of a technological revolution are not the basis for ill-considered predictions or anticipations of some selected future. His understanding of relevant concepts, e.g., instruction, allows him to avoid the technological fallacy. What he does in his argument is what we will all have to do before long: he tries to come to grips intellectually and morally with the effects of the new technology on schooling.

Notes

1. I exercise poetic license here. Actually, Bibliographic Retrieval Services, Inc., of Latham, New York, sent me the abstracts; but I assume ERIC told them to do so.

2. H. L. Beales, The Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967), pp. 28-29.

3. Beales, The Industrial Revolution, p. 29.

4. Beales, The Industrial Revolution, p. 7.

5. Beales, The Industrial Revolution, p. 9.

6. Joseph Weizenbaum, "Once More: The Computer Revolution," in The Computer Age: A Twenty-Year Review, eds. Michael Dertouzos and Joel Moses. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979), p. 442.

7. Harold Shane, "The Silicon Age and Education," Phi Delta Kappan (January 1982): 304.

8. Shane, pp. 305-308.

9. John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 67-77.

10. Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976), chapter 4.

11. Mortimer Taube, Computers and Common Sense: The Myth of Thinking Machines (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (New YOrk: Harper & Row, 1972); Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason.

12. For an account of the debate, see Pamela McCorduck, Machines Who Think (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979), chapters 8, 9, and 13. As one might gather from the title of McCorduck's book, she strongly favors the program of artificial intelligence.

13. Weizenbaum, "Once More: The Computer Revolution," pp. 441-442.

14. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason, pp. 2-6.

15. Kenneth Colby et al., "A Computer Method of Psychotherapy: Preliminary Communication," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 142 (1966): 148-152. Quoted in Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason, p. 5.

16. Carl Sagan, comment in Natural History 84 (January 1975): 10, quoted in Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason, p. 5.

17. Colby et al., "A Computer Method of Psychotherapy," quoted in Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason, p. 6.

18. Questions such as this are seriously considered in Aaron Sloman, The Computer Revolution in Philosophy: Philosophy, Science and Models of Mind (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press, 1978).

19. Francis Fisher, "Teaching, Scholarship, and the Computer: Perspectives of a Generalist," AAHE Bulletin (November 1982): 3.

20. Fisher, "Teaching, Scholarship, and the Computer," p. 6.

21. Seymour Papert, "Computers and Learning," in Michael Dertouzos and Joel Moses, The Computer Age, p. 85 (my emphasis).

22. Papert, "Computers and Learning," p. 86.

23. Papert, "Computers and Learning," p. 85.

24. William Pritchard, "Instructional Computing in 2001: A Scenario," Phi Delta Kappan (January 1982): 323-324.

25. "Automated Education," in Programs, Teachers, and Machines, eds. Alfred de Grazia and David Sohn (New York: Bantam Books, 1962), pp. 103-116.

26. Margaret Boden makes a good case for computational psychology in Minds and Mechanisms: Philosophical Psychology and Computational Models (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981).

27. McClellan, "Automated Education," p. 110.

28. McClellan, "Automated Education," p. 114.

29. McClellan, "Automated Education," p. 116.

21

SOME BITS AND BYTES: A RESPONSE TO RAITZ

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Keith's arguing that the idea of a computer revolution has very little predictive value or that it will not give us insights as to how to prepare for the future is not surprising. But, I must disagree in part with his analysis. Although a clear definition of the computer may be needed, we are indeed living in revolutionary or evolutionary times, not only social and political, but especially mental or cognitive. And there is no doubt that the computer (however defined) is at the heart of this revolution (however defined), even though the revolution goes by different names.

It is the computer as a collective symbol which is causing and helping and will cause and help people to do things differently. The computer, to be properly and fully used, demands and will continue to demand thinking. But, what is a computer? The computer is an electronic machine with the capacity to store data and the instructions by which data (inputs) are reorganized into information (outputs) for its user. There are mainframes, minis, and micros. Computers are either digital, if they process discrete data, or analog, if they process continuous data; they are either general-purpose, with the potential to be used for any (business, scientific, educational) application desired, or special-purpose, having been designed to accomplish a specific task.

Trying to pinpoint the beginning of the revolution may be difficult, but the task is not impossible. First, the term as used today refers to specific machines, which may vary in size, speed of processing and amount of memory. Second, while computers perform arithmetic and logical operations, the most significant aspect is the capacity to store not only the data, but especially the programmed instructions encoded to manipulate the data and restructure them into useful information (if you will permit me this redundancy). Third, we then can research the history of computers to see the first instances of a machine that does not fail our test.

As a symbol, the computer (every actual machine) provokes, elicits and channels feelings, thoughts and actions. These are polarized culturally, socially and psychologically in terms of the sensory or the ideological (to borrow Victor Turner's idea) and, I think, philosophically in terms of the instrumental and teleological uses. The computer symbolizes change of structures, designs and procedures in business, industry, electronics, technology, information, styles of thinking and learning, and lastly, cultural and social patterns of action. But, the change may not be revolutionary (that is, dramatic or sudden) but evolutionary. Thus, we may be looking in the wrong areas. I think the idea of the computer can be used to indicate change (on many fronts) but as with other cultural advances, it may not be able to be used to predict particular instances of change.

The most significant spheres where changes are occurring and will occur, are, I think, the psychological and in terms of world-views, what there is, what is knowable and how one learns and thinks. When a person learns to program a computer to accomplish a particular task, he or she learns a language such as Basic, Fortran, Cobol, Logo, or Pascal. From within anyone of these languages, reality is different. And the syntax of each language forces one to think about reality or the data and information differently. Indeed, to paraphrase Wittgenstein the limits of my language (be it Logo, Pascal, Cobol, Fortran or Basic) are the limits of my world. I cannot think or speak about the data (the objects of the universe defined by the language) in any way except as my particular programming language allows me to think and speak. For educational philosophers concerned about the impact of the computer, this may be a more fruitful area of inquiry and speculation than defining terms in use.

Keith also states that there is a danger for many, especially educators, who optimistically advocate the use of computers in every walk of life, to argue from a fallacious position. He calls it the Technological Fallacy or the Argument from Optimism. He argues that advocates of computers suppress the normative premise that, if a computer can be programmed to achieve a task, then this ought to be done. Keith is correct in his assessment and as a philosopher has the obligation to make explicit implicit premises and judgments. There is a real danger of thinking that models of human thinking developed via the computer are mirror images of the human mind, or of any other activities performed by human beings. Seeing the technological fallacy in the computerists' arguments will help us in uncovering other suppressed premises about the nature of reality, humanity and even morality.

In closing, I want to say that I too view with skepticism the advocation of the computer as a panacea for the many problems we face, especially in education. This brings to mind, a current advertisement by the NEA on TV. The advertisement opens with a young boy before a blackboard which has a multiplication problem on it. The viewer sees the anxiety and frustration on the student's face and in his hesitant behavior. He is so frustrated that he fails to solve the problem. Such pain, such lack of fun. The scenario shifts then to the same student in front of a computer. He is with a friend and on the monitor there is a multiplication problem being generated by a software package. The student is shown typing keys on the keyboard and the computer rewarding his efforts by displaying the correct answers. The advertisement ends with the problem solved (via the computer) and the message "learning can be fun." This is an example of an argument from optimism and our role as educational philosophers in the age of information, or computers, or technology is to be the critics of such practices and theories.

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THE PUBLIC SCHOOL'S SEARCH FOR A PUBLIC

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Prologue

The idea of a public school is grounded in a theory of the public good, a good that transcends the goods of individual citizens yet in the long run contributes to their realization.

In this country that good is adumbrated in an ideology or philosophy or theology expressed formally in the Declaration of Independence. The Constitution enunciates principles and rules for determining the public good both as a charter of government and as a guarantee of certain fundamental human rights. The public school is the "official" instructional arm of the public good, and like other public goods is to be regulated by the State, because it cannot be left to individual choice.

The customary strain between the individual and the public good has been exacerbated by the diversity of our population and a form of government that encourages tests of political power by conflicting interests.

The thesis of this paper is that the American public school is very near the limit of its ability to maintain a public instructional mission in the face of a fractionated public. Explicitly, the crisis manifests itself in the loss of control over the curriculum and erosion of confidence--real or alleged--by the citizenry. Implicitly, the diversity has weakened the social infrastructure of the public school undermining its roles in loco parentis, in loco communitatis and in loco humanitatis.

If to this list of disintegrating forces are added the current passion for deregulation, the moves for vouchers and tax credits for private school tuition, and proposals for alternative schools, the question: "Can the public school survive without a public?" becomes more than a play on words.

I shall try to indicate the role of the philosopher of education in the search for a principle of unity that can stem this disintegration. Can we formulate a rationally defensible principle of authority that will permit the public school to teach in behalf of the public good? Can we formulate criteria for a humane society? Can we conceptualize a curriculum that represents an enlightened human culture?

The Fragmentation of the School's Public

The philosophical problem is notoriously hoary and obdurate. The One and the Many, Particulars and Universals, Species and Individuals are all topics that Plato explored in his theory of the Forms and Aristotle in his doctrine

of the human telos. The search for the nature of human nature has traversed numerous biological and anthropological routes. It has survived the derision of linguistic analysis, logical positivism and relativism from Protagoras to Derrida.

This is not surprising. The human mind conceives universals, natural rights of man, a generic human nature yet can conceive counter examples and exceptions that undercut the universals. The ontological potency and fertility of the imagination is not self limiting. And thus are generated philosophical puzzles. I call them puzzles rather than problems because to be a problem a predicament needs to be trussed up for examination under this or that hypothesis, preferably an empirically verifiable one, whereas a puzzle requires fitting apparently incompatible ideas into a plausible, if not a logically necessary, pattern.[1] Theories about unity in diversity are perennial mind teasers that can neither be solved nor left alone. If the terms are defined so as to be mutually exclusive, there will be no solution; yet the existential tension between the individual and the collective stimulates the renewal of the search in every generation.

Diversity in all its forms confronts a public school with the need for some principle of unity, lest it becomes as fragmented and bewilderingly complicated as the society itself. It is a predicament eminently suited to philosophers of education, for on one hand it is grounded in some famous philosophical puzzles, while on the other it cries out for a practical solution. Accordingly, philosophers of education, who are concerned with both the puzzles of philosophy and the predicaments of schooling, should have first jurisdiction in dealing with the situation. In doing so they have to resist a double-headed serpent brandishing dual temptations. One is to state the predicament and its importance and forthwith retreat to the puzzles in "straight" philosophy. The other is to offer seminars and workshops in educational leadership for school principals and superintendents.

There is nothing wrong with either laudable enterprise except that there is no lack of certified philosophers and specialists in organizational theory and techniques abound. From philosophers of education the school establishment has a right to expect conceptual clarification of the educational problems involved and the rational assessment of proposals for educational solutions.[2]

Yet the philosophical puzzle cannot be brushed aside as an irrelevant abstraction. For although absolute and relative seem to be irreconcilable opposites, relativism in its unmitigated form creates existential absolutes, just as absolutist theories do. If each cultural enclave insists on freedom from judgment and claims validity by virtue of its existence, it takes on the character of an absolute. Such autonomous groups pay for their freedom by isolation or by conflict with other groups. At best they tolerate each other's existence; at worst they exert political pressure to reach their goals. When the target is a public school that has already conceded the principle of cultural relativism, the result is fragmentation of the curriculum and its policy.

What are some of the cultural enclaves that tend to become absolutized? Social classes, elites of various types (military, ecclesiastical, intellectual) and social institutions are the more familiar examples. The members of the group adopt a value system and modes of behavior that are beyond question within the group, and invulnerable to criticism from outside of it. There is nothing new about this diversification except the extent and rate. The number of Political Action groups is an indicator of the increase.

In the 60's and 70's the number of value cults proliferated, ranging from fundamentalist groups at one end of the spectrum to hippie communes at the other. The late 60's and the early 70's, however, witnessed an acceleration of constituency formation that made demands on the public schools. The Civil Rights legislation made it possible for the physically and mentally handicapped to demand equality of opportunity both with respect to instruction and the physical access to it. Mainstreaming these constituencies into the regular classroom placed the ordinary teacher in the ordinary classroom under unusual strain.

Other disintegrating factors could be discussed, but I shall stress two that entrained especially serious consequences for the public school. One is the diversification of household arrangements. Some of these were the result of changing mores with respect to sex and divorce. Some were caused by changing employment patterns of women so that the childrearing, housekeeping functions had to be altered. One result has been to bring into question the role of the school in loco parentis. What "family" is it to represent?

Aside from the explicit legal conditions and provisions of this doctrine, there is the no less important implicit one. It is the expectation that the school will reinforce the values and attitudes of the ideal family as conceived by the community at any given time. The teacher is to be the ideal parent combining affection with impartial discipline. This assumes, however, a fairly clear image of the standard family that sends its children to the school. Private schools, of course, have an easier time of it for obvious reasons. Public schools today do not have a clear image of the families of their pupils. What used to go without saying about the nutrition, health care, moral training and the like performed by the family now has to be specified, qualified and investigated by a social welfare counselor.

Furthermore, the public school cannot rely on the home to reinforce the value of schooling, respect for teachers, standards of deportment and the like. The school can no longer rely on the family to get and keep the child ready for instruction. When the school was asked to assume these responsibilities, it was asked to become a home and family, not simply a surrogate. This it has not succeeded in becoming despite a multitude of programs and titles.

The second development is the attempt to mandate equal educational opportunity for blacks, native Americans and ethnic minorities. The principle, it goes without saying is morally unassailable. The implementation, however, was asking the school to undo centuries of discrimination, and socioeconomic

inequalities. The means for accomplishing this were federal grants under various titles to implement remedial programs. In short, what the government and the body politic were unwilling to do on a systematic basis, i.e., to change social and economic pressures on the disadvantaged with budgets the size of the Pentagon's it mandated the schools to do with a series of Titles.[3]

That the public schools or their administrations acquiesced in this foolproof formula for failure was unconscionable, let alone understandable, but having accepted the responsibility, there was no way of opposing the next development. This came in the form of an assertion that each ethnic or, more generally, cultural group had a right to maintain its own cultural traditions, including its language, and that it had the same claim on the school as any other cultural pattern, especially the WASP pattern that had preempted the title of "American." I shall not review the studies on the effects of this cultural imperialism on the pupil's self-concept, motivation, and on school achievement. I have no quarrel with these studies and given a commitment to the cultural relativism there can be no quarrel with the claims of any group to equal treatment of its culture in the public schools. However, the effect of these demands on the public schools, if taken literally and seriously, is also unmistakable, especially in metropolitan areas.

For one thing, the school establishment to function multi-linguistically and multi-culturally will have to wait until a generation of classroom teachers trained to do this comes into being. For another many descendants of immigrants do not believe in multi-cultural and multi-lingual instruction in the public schools. They tend to agree with Horace Mann that the public schools were to be a major means of Americanizing the immigrant populations.

The Statue of Liberty, it is true, invited the old world countries to send their poor and huddled masses, but not to bring their old world cultures with them or to persist in them after arrival. Furthermore, there are many descendants of these immigrants who "made it" in America without federal programs and who are not sympathetic to groups that (a) do not wish to become Americanized or (b) cannot join the mainstream of American life without special help. On the contrary, there is often an unspoken belief that groups needing special dispensations are lacking in intelligence or strength of character or both.[4]

What about the school's role <u>in loco communitatis</u>? Traditionally, the school represented and reinforced the professed values of the community not the tolerated ones. Today even conventionalized hypocrisy unity is hard to achieve as any parent-teachers meeting will attest. Is the school to represent Reganomics, the ACLU, the conservationists, the reformers, the political activists? Or does it ignore political squabbles devoting the social studies period to the study of the constitution and the structure of the government? The result is a cautious neutrality in all matters on which the community sentiment is divided. Except in small culturally homogeneous villages we can expect a more or less complete politicalization of the curriculum and the materials of instruction,[5] and with it an increasing multiplication of subjects and courses.

How much diversity can a public school handle without disintegration? The proliferation of courses and the reaction against the dilution of content may be a sign that the workable limit may already have been exceeded. The attempt to use the secondary schools for an ever-increasing variety of vocations has not only made a shambles of general education, but even of the basic academic skills. Simple reduction, changes of emphasis, longer hours, merit pay will generate more publicity than change. A systematic reform oddly enough may require a radical step backwards.

A Bold Leap Backward

The reform, or better, the reform strategy will require two major tasks. One is the formulating credible criteria for a good society. The other requires a theory of authority that will enable the school to formulate a uniform curriculum conducive to functioning in a good society. The first requirement should make it possible to ask of any cultural enclave how well it meets the criteria. The second poses the question in the form: What is there in your culture that should be taught to everyone?

Criteria of a Good Society

If the United States version of a democratic society claims the right to acculturate a wide array of citizens from other parts of the globe, it can do so only if there is a strong consensus on its ethos, not only within its own borders of geography and history, but on principles that have wide acceptance in the human family. Without any pretense of finality, I suggest three such principles viz., achievement potential, justice, and compassion.

Achievement potential refers to the freedom for the individual to develop talent. It takes for granted that talent will not be distributed equally among the population, but these inequalities can yield valuable forays into knowledge, technology, social organization that in some sense can contribute to progress, indeed to make it possible.

Justice, is needed to control the evils of uncontrolled competition. Essentially, I took justice to be a form of fairness that permitted inequality of benefits under certain conditions yet protected the citizens from inequalities perpetuated by improper use of power and political manipulation.[6]

Compassion, is the attitude of a society toward the inevitable losers, who despite opportunity and fairness, still seem unable to escape misery and misfortune. This is not the appropriate occasion to expound and defend these criteria. I have tried to do so elsewhere in some detail.[7] Here my concern is to argue that such principles can be formulated to mitigate methodological relativism and to assess claims of diverse cultural enclaves to be a place in the curriculum of the public school. Not only immigrant and highly esoteric cultures should be assessed but the so-called standard American culture as well.

These criteria are not the only ones that have been proposed for a good society. The democratic ethos with its emphasis on freedom, rationality, and equality has been a guiding principle of the nation, however variously interpreted and implemented. The Dewey revolution in educational thinking proposed a method by which not only the ethos, but its application in the school and community could follow the logic of scientific inquiry. However, this is not an essay on political theory. The important point is that we may be able to formulate a workable yardstick to gauge the claims of diverse cultures. By workable, I mean only that we can speak meaningfully of one society being more or less concerned with achievement, justice, and compassion than another.

What is the minimal consensus needed for a unifying educational principle? And what is the maximum consensus one can expect in the present state of cultural and political fragmentation?

No religious doctrine, political creed, philosophical system, cultural hero appears to qualify as a likely candidate for such a role. The democratic process does. It commands allegiance in principle however varied the interpretation for particular legislation. The second is that the participation in the democratic process be informed.

It follows that a commitment to democracy carries the right and duty of the individual to be educated and the obligation of the community to provide schooling. Education for enlightened citizenship has an archaic sound, but it was an eloquent message as enunciated by Boyd H. Bode, H. Gordon Hullfish, George S. Counts, W. O. Stanley, B. O. Smith, Kenneth Benne, George Axtelle, and many others, including Philip G. Smith. The problem is not to find a substitute for an enlightened citizenry, but to scrutinize anew the curriculum that would provide it in a fragmented society.

Pluralism and Unity—Good and Bad

The formulation of universal criteria does not entail mindless uniformity but it does raise the question as to what sort of pluralism is consistent with the criteria and what is not.

The virtues of diversity are too familiar to need repetition. Not the least is a relief from tediousness. The greater the complexity a life or a work of art can unify the richer, the more interesting, and more important it is likely to be.

Neither the school nor the pupil can cope with a complexity and variety that has the internal unification of a junkyard or an attic. Pluralism that stresses the bizarre, the eccentric, the idiosyncratic for the sake of novelty reduces responsibility for consequences and trivializes life. Pluralism that allows individuals to evade opportunities of developing their potential is bad. Options that permit pupils to evade learning that at the moment seems uncongenial, abstract, or simply bookish are bad pluralism bad individualism, and bad schooling.

Unity likewise can be good or bad. Good unity is a theme with interesting variations, the sort exhibited in good art, good science, and a good society. It is a whole of which the parts are at once distinctively individual and necessary elements of the whole. Bad unity, by contrast cannot distinguish between capricious and productive diversity. Not even the most rigid totalitarian states can achieve complete uniformity, but the variations they suppress are likely to the most productive ones.

Good unity and good pluralism require each other; bad unity and bad pluralism are the consequences of not knowing the difference between them. In the educational happenings of the past decade this ignorance has been made respectable by denying that the difference exists. But there is a profound difference between variations on a theme and differences without one.

Cultural traits and behaviors that do not enhance the potential for achievement or contribute to a system of justice, or are indicative of compassion may be interesting if sufficiently quaint and keep the memories of the native country alive, but they are not sufficient grounds for disrupting the public schools for their preservation.

If, as it has been argued, the public school can no longer meet the demands of a growing number of groups willing to use political means to achieve their goals, then two options need consideration. One is to continue trying to satisfy as many constituencies as possible. This seems to be a losing strategy unless one is willing to have the public school break into an indefinite number of private schools more or less financed by public funds.

The other is take the stand that although the public school can no longer serve in loco parentis and in loco communitatis, it can make a bid to stand in loco humanitatis. For Cicero humanitas was the study of Greek and Roman letters or literature. Barbaritas was the state of being ignorant of these literatures. For a long time classical education followed the Ciceronian conception of the humanistic studies.

Today humanitas would have to include not only the customary subjects included in the humanities but many of the sciences as well. In short, education for humanitas today calls for a program of general education--general in the sense that it can be prescribed for all pupils and generalizable to a wide variety of situations. The public school could become the custodian and provider of such instruction, and in that sense act in loco humanitatis.

Two major tasks confront making good on such a claim. First and foremost would be to legitimize the school's authority to construct a curriculum. The second would be to construct it.

Authority

Today the curriculum of the public school is being fragmented by politicalization. There is no escape from such politicalization so long as

all curriculum problems are subject to political authority. The right of the citizenry to pass judgment on all communal questions is hard to contravene both in practice and in principle. Suppose, however, we ask two questions: "What is good chemistry or good physics or good literature?" And then ask: What is good chemistry, good physics, good literature good for?"

Clearly the answers to these questions are not subject to the same criteria. The first can be answered by scholars in the respective disciplines. The institutional apparatus for such scholarship is ancient and respected by the guild of scholars. Status in the guild bestows on the scholar the intellectual authority of the guild itself. A school board might take a vote on the answer to the first question, but the inappropriateness of doing so would be apparent to the voters themselves; they recognize in themselves and their neighbors a lack of authority to make such judgments. The authority of the guild at any given time derives from a consensus of the learned on topics and issues in the several fields of scholarship.

However, the second question is eligible for several answers. There may be an informed opinion as to the good the study of a given discipline would do for the pupil, the community, the nation, etc. But informed or not the citizen has the right to say what "good" the study will do him or his community; the political process is designed to discover what vox populi is saying.

It follows that if the school is to assert an authority that could challenge the political will, it must be in those areas in which there is a guild of scholarship and a consensus of the learned. And this they will find only in the well-established academic disciplines.

A program of the arts and sciences graded for various levels of instruction is, it seems to me, the line of strategic retreat and survival. The construction of the curriculum is an ideal enterprise for uniting educationists and academicians. Two of my colleagues joined me just about twenty years ago in constructing such a curriculum for the secondary school[9] and others have tried their hand at similar ventures. Two obvious objections I shall anticipate, and if they seem cavalier, I plead that this is not the occasion to argue them at length. One is that a uniform curriculum grossly, even recklessly, ignores individual differences. The short reply is that such differences can be met by adjusting time allotments and grouping for instruction rather than by varying the content. The other is that such an academic curriculum ignores all the other good things that a school system might do for the pupil. Driver education, vocational education, alcohol and drug education not to mention sex education, athletics, hobbies, etc. can be provided in extracurricula time with all the panache and resources that a community can afford or is willing to spend.

Many activities can be required without granting academic credit; some having nothing to do with instruction but are conveniently provided on the school premises, e.g., school lunches, physical exercise, eye examinations, and the like. If the required general curriculum is kept clean and lean, there will be a good deal of time left for extras.

There is, however, an important condition for the acceptance of an universal curriculum, namely, that it represents a universal culture. It must qualify as humanitas in the best sense of that word. It should reflect as much as possible as few of the idiosyncracies of geography and nationality as possible. It too should be able to justify itself on the criteria of a good and humane society.

Epilogue

I hope this disquisition may illustrate the sort of contribution that philosophers of education can be expected to make to a major educational predicament--the public school without a public. By asserting the right to prescribe the instruction necessary and suitable for the public good in a good society, the school has a chance of providing the unity that is not being eroded. Scanning the cultural resources for contents that qualify for general education is a task in which philosophers of education can collaborate with subject matter specialists and teachers. How the content of various disciplines are used in post-school life is an epistemological problem worthy of our best efforts, because the confusion of end-of-course test scores with life uses is an insidious foe of general education; but a very effective one.

If we cannot discover the universal culture for the universal human nature, we can take a few steps toward mitigating the absurdities of unmitigated relativism. If we cannot solve the philosophical puzzle of the One and the Many, Universals and Particulars, we can look for a unity that is not mindless uniformity and a pluralism that is more than variety.

Notes

1. Cf. my "Predicaments, Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes Educational," Theory, 33:1 (1983): 33-39

2. The current spate of commission, reports, studies, and regurgitation of wisdom about the public schools, teachers, and colleges of education somehow presumably have not yet heard of philosophers of education.

3. Cf. my "Federal Intervention in Education: Expectations and Frustrations," Education and Urban Society, 15:3 (May 1983): 291-308.

4. The notion of the "melting pot," I believe, is credited to Horace Kallen but in recent years has fallen into disrepute as an attempt to suppress other cultures. However, the melting pot has not always melted down cultural differences. Certainly they have not obliterated such differences in large cities where ethnic neighborhoods have flourished for a long time. A more apt metaphor, it seems to me, is to think of Americanization as a form of flavoring or seasoning. Irish-American, Italo-American, Mexican-American, Greek-American have a flavor that distinguishes them for the Irish-Irish, Italo-Italians, etc. This difference is immediately recognized when the emigrants return to the old country for a visit. Perhaps by new methods of sociological chemistry, we can isolate and discover the "true" ingredients of Americanization.

5. Cf. John Schaffarzick and Gary Sykes, eds., Value Conflicts and Curriculum Issues. (Berkeley, CA: McCutheon, 1979); and also my review of it in Journal of Curriculum Studies, 13:3 (1981): 247-252.

6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971).

7. "Criteria for a Humane Society," Educational Studies, 8 (1977): 37-50.

8. For example, Gunnar Myrdal's American Creed in An American Dilemma (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944).

9. H. S. Broudy, B. O. Smith, and Joe R. Burnett, Democracy and Excellence in American Secondary Education (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964). In that volume we tried to put together symbolics of information, basic concepts of the major empirical sciences, mathematics, three developmental areas, problem solving, and exemplars so that they would satisfy the criteria for general education.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF JUST COMMUNITY IN SCHOOLS

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> For any act (as distinct from mere impulse) there must be 'theory,' and the wider the act, the greater its import, the more exigent the demand for theory. It is not likely that the wheels of moral movement are to be revised after two thousand and more years. It was Socrates who initiated the movement, when he said that 'an unexamined life is not one to be led by man.'. . . Not even customary morality, that of respectability and of convention, is freed from dependence upon theory; it simply lives off the funded results of some once-moving examination of life.[1]
>
> —John Dewey

This paper will explore two concerns which are central to the "just community" approach. The first is that there can be basic goals of a program for education emphasizing student participation. The second is that these involve issues where democratically-run decision making can favorably impact upon student life. These points are not at great variance from concerns many educators involved with promoting just and effective education would find propitious.

To take a case in point, the founders of the Scarsdale Alternative School, in Scarsdale, N.Y., identify the following goals as central to their own expectations in implementing democratic student governance:

(1) to create a sense of community where students and teachers could increasingly learn to work together toward agreed-upon goals,

(2) to establish a workable democratic school governance system,

(3) to emphasize community and cooperation while recognizing the individual needs and differences within the community,

(4) to increase students' freedom and responsibility in pursuing their own education,

(5) to heighten students' and teachers' awareness of, and attention to, process in the school without sacrificing product and content,

(6) to make the school less isolated from, and more responsible to, the larger community outside its four walls.[2]

The development of democratic decision making through the achievement of these goals has been the task of the Scarsdale Alternative school since 1977. Similar projects have occurred in Cambridge, Brookline, and Pittsburgh. These have largely been alternative school settings where issues are initially debated in advisory groups of 10-12 people (or "Fairness Committees"), including at least one teacher. This small group setting, cognitive developmental theorists believe, is an effective realm for thorough proposal of solutions. Further moral discussion takes place at a weekly meeting involving the entire student and faculty school community. This situation provides an atmosphere where adult guidance becomes a form of "advocacy" in the democratic determination of solutions. As Kohlberg summarizes, the actual procedure is one where "Students chair the community meetings, sometimes appealing for guidance to their advisors. In these contexts, there has been no need to limit students' authority in any formal way."[3]

Implementators of just community discussion and governance groups at Scarsdale, The Cambridge Cluster School, and the Niantic prison, do vary the structural components, but they share a concern for utilizing developmental theory to inform their practice. Whether it's staff development or community meetings, the insights gained by an understanding of moral development theory hold definite implications for practice. As the developers of the Scarsdale Alternative School express, cognitive developmental theory provides a conceptual framework for channeling conflict between individuals and groups in a way such that socio-moral growth results. In "Creating a 'Just Community': The Transformation of an Alternative School," Codding and Arenella write that

> Moral development stage theory helped us to see that the kind of communitarian, institutional point of view which we as teachers reasoning at stage 4 or 5 saw so clearly, was not a vision that most of our high school students could fully share. It was a goal to which we all could aspire provided we could create the necessary conditions to promote stage growth in individual students and an atmosphere conducive to stage 4 reasoning in the community at large.[4]

In arguing for school democracy implementators of just community education are seeking to encourage the development of awareness of principles of constitutional democracy. The desire to act according to democratic principles was articulated by Socrates. As Kohlberg notes, Socrates' belief ". . . in the power of free dialogue about justice was his faith in Athenian democracy."[5] Achieving a dialogue where concerns about democracy are questioned, applied, affirmed, and reaffirmed are key goals of just community moral education.

For this reason Kohlberg, following Newmann, regards this goal as one subscribing to a "participatory-idea-list" philosophy of democracy. As a philosophy of human development it posits that the "educational aim of full individual human development can only be reached through an education for full participation in society or in a human community."[6] Thus experiences of participation, with the above ideals in mind, constitute values for this type of principled morality. Additionally, creating opportunities of participation result in higher stages of cognitive, moral, and ego development.

A similar administrative model to S.A.S. (Scarsdale Alternative School) was established at the Cambridge Cluster School, an alternative high school existing within Cambridge High and Latin School since 1974. All major agreements and decisions are made through the democratic participation of the community. Although certain school rules and state laws are not able to be voted upon, in many cases the definition of what these laws mean and the determination of fair means of supporting them are handled democratically. That is, a cooperative relationship stressing responsibility, power, and authority sharing, took the place of a rigid authoritative administrative structure.

The participatory democracy necessary to make the above type of governance possible is difficult to achieve. As Garrod and Wasserman note,[7] Kohlberg's research at the Israeli Kibbutzim and in correctional institutions (such as the Niantic Women's Prison) suggested that participatory democracy must be made a key educational or institutional goal. The Just Community approach, in focusing on democracy as a moral education, appropriated school democracy as a central concern. Also, it was found to be crucial that the decisions that the students make are relevant and engaging. Rather than participate in scheduling, staffing, and other administrative matters, the subject matter of school democracy should involve issues of fairness and morality. Finally, success is maximized when all members of the community are able to directly participate in community meetings. This has been facilitated by the creation of small groups, sometimes called advisor or core groups (of 15 or so students), concerned with eliciting the individual's response in the discussion, making and reinforcement of rules, which occurs in the larger community meetings.

The upshot of these efforts is an attempt to make explicit the best conditions for moral growth, whether they be opportunities for small group, pupil-to-pupil interaction, or attention to the overall school climate, or what we call "moral atmosphere." Wasserman and Garrod delineate five dimensions through which moral growth may be promoted in Just Community contexts.[8] (1) Exposure to Cognitive Moral Conflict. This occurs when faculty and students debate actual issues, such as how to deal with rule infractions. (2) Role Taking. Prior to being able to resolve problems relating to considerations of issues of justice and fairness, people need to take the perspectives of others involved in a conflict in order to increase understanding of the problem, and contribute favorably to its resolution. (3) Consideration of Fairness and Morality. Issues of fairness arise whenever two or more people are involved in a social conflict. The process becomes moral when teachers aim at facilitating a fair solution, usually involving some degree of compromise, and aiming at a resolution that takes account of all points of view involved. (4) Exposure to Next Higher Stage of Moral Reasoning. Teachers need to stimulate class discussions by becoming skilled questions-askers. They need to highlight higher stage responses to dilemmas if they arise naturally during the course of student discussions.

When higher stage reasoning does not spontaneously occur, teachers need to evoke such considerations. If they are monitoring the direction the discussion is taking, and aware of the goals of the course, they will be better able to advocate moral reasoning representing higher stage structure without lecturing, moralizing, or being indoctrinative. (5) Active Participation and Group Decision-Making. A feeling on the part of students of the importance of membership in the community is crucial to the success of collective moral education. The decisions made by the group include creating and enforcing rules. All skills that increase this sense of belonging to the community should be utilized by the teacher to foster a sense of responsibility to the community and its tenets. Thus, there are several factors that need to be present for just community education to be effective.

Before moving on to philosophic and theoretical considerations, it would be useful to examine a few implications of just community education as summarized above. The first area concerns the teacher's role in the process of utilizing democratic governance to promote moral education. The second question involves a question many readers (or listeners) may feel nagged by at this point: What curricular effects result from just community schools? i.e., must there be less time spent on various "hard" or content subject matters, and are they any specific learning outcomes, a la academic or curricular goals, which result from the establishment of democratic governance? Let us begin with the first question.

Teachers react variously to the prospect of their school or classroom becoming a just community. Some feel the installation of a democratic system of one-man-one-vote would strip them of their last vestige of classroom power. It seems apparent, however, that a teacher who feels overly threatened by being a voting member in a community meeting responsible for making school rules, may be overly reliant upon his autocratic positional authority within the institution to begin with. Moreover, just community theory and practice arose from a feeling of crisis regarding the participation of young people in society.

In this same context, some teachers wonder whether placing the power to make, repeal, and enforce all school rules in the hands of the student majority would not lead to either chaos or a junta of the type described in Lord of the Flies. But, these states only occur when teachers' and administrators' authority is rebelled against by students, and there is a strong "we/they" atmosphere. Most likely, schools such as these have no greater sense of community within their students than peer group norms, which are typically contentious toward school authority. And, as Kohlberg notes in summarizing the research, there is the option of course, to simply stipulate rules regarding attendance and school behavior. However, it's usually possible ". . . to arrive at rules consistent with these schoolwide regulations through the democratic process."

Thus, democratic tyranny doesn't necessarily result from democratic governance. But it can result. At most democratic schools there are no schoolwide policies or requirements designed to protect the minority. Teachers do tend to encourage the presence of norms to consider the rights and

viewpoints of the minority. It has not yet been determined whether these norms should be institutionalized. This would involve attempting to make them a part of the collective normative valuing of the school community. At present, the recommendation that each school must be considered individually with respect to this, should be adequate.

Community meetings and fairness committee meetings do often debate about issues of minority rights, a consideration that tends to emerge in majority rule situations. This is illustrated in a student's rendition of life in the Scarsdale Alternative School community, and the dealings of its fairness committee:

> The broadest and serious of administrative issues are manageable when confronted openly. Drug use is just one such issue we have dealt with at S.A.S. We have dealt with affirmative action, academic requirements and standards, and evaluation methods. A school cannot set a policy concerning affirmative action admissions, for instance, without considering how that policy would affect students. 'How does it feel to be in a disproportionate minority?' . . . can only be answered by students. It is the type of issue that, while viewed differently by students than faculty, is one that students struggle with as much as faculty, and one that our school is not yet finished confronting.[10]

It is possible to conclude then, that just community living, at least in alternative schools, does provide a forum for a self-governing operation highly concerned with issues of fairness and justice, as well as with efficacy in the solution of problems.

Having said something about the authority structure in a just community school, it is now possible to conclude that a teacher who practices from a strong embeddedness in positional authority may not have a temperament amenable to being a member of a just community educational structure. But what else can be said about the teacher's role in a just community? As Thomas Lickona notes, the teacher as a conciliator and moral educator should be concerned with promoting role taking and moving students toward fair solutions.[11]

Additionally, the teacher should be concerned with instilling strategies that contribute toward inviting peer-to-peer cooperation. A vital propaedeutic to this is the stimulation of thinking, which the teacher may accomplish by asking questions and giving examples to facilitate the students' solution to the problem. Since the psychological learning theory underlying this form of socio-moral education is developmental and constructivist, the teacher becomes a facilitator of cognitive growth in terms of the student's acquisition of new knowledge, insights and skills. This means that the educator engaged in both direct instruction and a series of steps that get students to discover or independently arrive at insights and solutions to problems.

Illustrative of the way developmental theory can inform practice is one educator's account of the effect developmental theory had upon her own educational philosophy.

> . . . the theory combines a Piagetian-type stage theory with a Deweyian progressivism to set the aim of education to be development of one's moral (cognitive and affective) reasoning abilities. Education should be individually based, to nourish interaction with society, to attain higher levels of problem-solving capabilities and moral development. Rather than expecting a set pattern of desired behavior, a challenging and experimenting process is encouraged. Knowledge occurs when a problematic situation is resolved. There are no relative values placed on the individual for the 'proper' ways to see the world and resolve any given situation.[12]

Moral education based upon developmental theory clearly, then, has merits for educators, who like Ms. Prusnofsky, find that a just community approach[13] does more than prepare students for participation in society. There is the additional awareness that emotional or affective involvement increases students' involvement in the cognitive components of education. The development of the theory posits indicates that greater cognitive advancement or increased cognitive complexity is a necessary condition for democratic decision-making. There is a better ability to delineate and understand particular choices and their consequences.

Philosophically, these efforts rest upon the teacher's concern with promoting moral growth, in a manner in which he or she, as Kohlberg puts it, "is assumed to be a moral philosopher animated by a concern for the ideal form of the God or justice."[14] What is built into this is a concern for justice in its broadest sense. The theory is explicit in maintaining that this concept of justice is universal and not tied to the specific moral content of a time, place, or group. Rather, the teacher's goal is to develop an ongoing philosophic dialogue, which does not reflect an attempt to inculcate any particular moral content, and is hence, nonindoctrinative.

Therefore, it should be clear that while techniques such as the encouragement of interpersonal or intersubjective participation have been shown to be of value, there is no attempt to assign morality a particular content.

At this point, I think it's appropriate to turn to the second question, that of moral education's relationship to the rest of the curriculum. This seems to be an important question, since Kohlberg et al. are acutely aware that an important task of the theorist is to advise educators in the practice of moral education. As he states ". . . the theorist, as consultant, searches for concepts and methods which would help this teacher's practice and decision-making rather than simply functioning as a psychologist making prescriptions to teachers based on developmental psychology theory and research."[15] Thus, if we assume that the task of theory is to inform practice, the next logical question is, What benefits does the just community approach have for

American high school education? We have already suggested that a just community entails a restructuring of education to promote the participation of students in order to enable them to weigh personal claims against societal claims. Furthermore, when we regard society's claims as centering around citizenship in a democratic society, we have spelled out an educational ideal that every board of public education in the country would acknowledge.

Promoting democratic governance in whatever form, whether it's a town meeting involving the whole school or a fairness committee working on grievance procedures, hopefully makes the school a better place for learning. It seeks to establish a school climate where students feel connected with the school. At the same time, they feel impelled to take responsibility for their education.

The establishment of democracy in education, we should note, will not automatically make the school a better place for learning and cause students to take responsibility for their own learning. It certainly can, in the right hands. Since democracy entails conflict, we cannot be certain that school personnel will properly channel this conflict into productive ends.

Having briefly looked at just community in a macro sense, in terms of its effects upon the entire school, we will now very briefly examine moral education's relationship to other studies. Given, the present paper is not about curriculum design or implementation. However, the actual applicability of moral education to secondary school situations, as we have seen, is a focal point of the theory.

Most projects designed from cognitive developmental moral theory are based upon an integration of the subject matter of regular study with moral dilemma discussions. Kohlberg, in responding to Sobol, stresses that moral and civic education "is a key to integrating experiences in social studies with English."[16] As to the issue of whether making moral discussions part of the teaching of regular academic subjects weakens or detracts from their purpose, the following points emerge from a consideration of cognitive development moral theory. First, many of the understandings academic subjects aim to achieve are moral in nature. For example, a goal of civic education is to promote the maintenance of social contract. Toward this end, moral educators, in their veln, seek to promote development of reasoning and discussion skills that make participation in such a social contract possible.

Finally, moral discussions result in a deeper understanding of literature and American history. Increased abilities to comprehend perspectives of actors in fictional and non-fictional renditions have been documented.[17] Thus, moral discussion clearly has curricular benefits and can lead toward the achievement of several learning objectives. By making moral development an aim of education, we have not shortchanged the teaching of other subject matters. Rather, moral discussions in just community situations or elsewhere make possible the conveying of a number of learning objectives, as well as promote participation in democratic decision-making and governance.

Notes

1. John Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice," International Journal of Ethics 1 (1982); reprinted in Joseph Ratner, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey (New York: Putnam, 1928), pp. 311-312.

2. Judith Codding and Anthony Arenella, "Creating a Just Community: The Transformation of an Alternative School," Moral Education Forum, 6, 4 (Winter, 1981): 7.

3. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education: A Response to Thomas Sobol," Educational Leadership, 38, 1 (October 1980): 21.

4. Judith Codding and Anthony Arenella, "Creating a 'Just Community': The Transformation of an Alternative School," Moral Education Forum, 6, 4 (Winter, 1981): 7.

5. Lawrence Kohlberg, "High School Democracy and Educating for a Just Society," in Moral Education, Ralph Moser, ed. (New York: Praeger Publ., 1980), p. 53.

6. Ibid., p. 34.

7. Elsa Wasserman and Andrew Garrod, "Application of Kohlberg's Theory to Curricula and Democratic Schools," Journal of Educational Analysis (Fall 1982).

8. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

9. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education: A Response to Thomas Sobol," Educational Leadership, 38, 1 (October 1980): 21.

10. William Kolber, "Living in a 'Just Community': A Student Perspective," Moral Education Forum, 6, 4 (Winter 1981): 45.

11. Thomas Lickona, "Cognitive-Developmental Approaches to Social and Moral Education," in Developmental Psychology and Early Education, L. Kohlberg and Rheta DeVries, eds. (New York: Longman, in press).

12. David Sachs and Vicky Prusnofsky, "Supporting a 'Just Community' Concept: Sharing Moral Development Theory and Practice With Teachers," Moral Education Forum, 6, 4 (Winter 1981): 27.

13. For an analysis of the effects of just community education, see Socoski's critical review of the evaluations of the effectiveness of just community programs, which is forthcoming. Also, research by Ann Higgins and Clark Power indicates that the data offers evidence that, of example, moral atmosphere--such as that which occurs in just communities--is a stimulus for the moral growth of students. See Ann Higgins, "Research and

Measurement Issues in Moral Education Interventions," in Ralph Mosher, ed., Moral Education: A First Generation of Research and Development. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), chapter 5.

14. Lawrence Kohlberg, "High School Democracy and Educating For a Just Society," p. 53.

15. Ibid., p. 53.

16. Thomas Sobol, "An Administrator Looks at Moral Education," Educational Leadership, 38, 1 (October 1980): 21.

17. Sharf, Peter, William McCoy, and Diane Ross, Growing Up Moral: Dilemmas for the Intermediate Grades (Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press, 1979). See also Galbraith, Ronald E. and Thomas Jones, Moral Reasoning: A Teaching Handbook for Adapting Kohlberg to the Classroom (Anoka, MN: Greenhaven Press, 1976).

MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION: A REEVALUATION

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I.

Joe Burnett was quite correct when he observed that, "John Dewey was never well or widely understood."[1] This is especially true in the case of moral education. In this paper, I wish to examine one Deweyan work on moral education, which has been seriously misinterpreted: Moral Principles in Education[2] (MPE).

The two most popular contemporary approaches to moral education (Lawrence Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental approach and Values Clarification) both claim to be grounded in the theory of John Dewey.[3] Dewey's MPE is probably the most widely cited work to which these moral education theorists consistently appeal for confirmation of their respective theoretical positions.[4] This is reasonable, since MPE is generally believed to be Dewey's magnum opus on moral education. But how can these two approaches, which are, at the very least, contradictory, both be grounded in Deweyan theory? The problem rests, in part, on the fact that MPE has been misunderstood in significant ways.

It is possible that both Kohlbergians and Values Clarification theorists intended to deceive their audiences in claiming to be grounded in the work of Dewey, in order to obtain a popular (albeit implied) stamp of approval, and to have "Dewey on their side." This is possible, but not likely. I wish to provide a more plausible explanation for this situation. The Kohlbergians and Values Clarificationists have taken Dewey's advice in MPE in earnest, but at face value and in relative isolation from his other works on and related to moral education.

Dewey's advice is found in the final paragraphs of MPE. He concludes MPE with an invitation and plea that the choice remaining to educators is not whether or not to engage in the practice of moral education. Rather, Dewey assumes that moral education in schools is unavoidable and suggests that educators must decide the contextual specifics of what and how moral education should be organized.

> What we need in education is a genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application. . . . These moral principles need to be brought down to the ground through their statement in social and in psychological terms. We need to see that moral principles are not arbitrary, that they are not "transcendental;" that the term "moral" does not designate a special region or portion of life. We need to translate the moral into the impulses and habits of the individual.

> All the rest is mint, anise, and cumin. The one thing needful is that we recognize that moral principles are real in the same sense in which other forces are real; that they are inherent in community life, and in the working structure of the individual. If we can secure a genuine faith in this fact, we shall have secured the condition which alone is necessary to get from our educational system all the effectiveness there is in it. The teacher who operates in this faith will find every subject, every method of instruction, every incident of school life pregnant with moral possibility.[5]

That every subject, method and incident can be pregnant with moral possibility does not mean that any subject, method or incident necessarily contains moral worth in a Deweyan view. In taking Dewey's lead and "operating in this faith," Kohlbergians and Values Clarificationists have indeed created distinct approaches to moral education. However, operating in a Deweyan faith necessitates an accurate comprehension and translation of Deweyan conceptual and theoretical notions into practice; notions such as principles and rules, community and democracy, individual and social, impulses and habits, means and ends, the double-barrelled theory of experience and the scientific or reflective method of thinking.[6] Kohlbergians and Values Clarificationists can claim to be operating within a framework of moral principles, but cannot legitimately claim to be operating within a framework of Deweyan moral principles. Not only have they misunderstood the function of specific Deweyan moral principles, but more importantly, they have misunderstood the nature and function of Deweyan principles in general.[7]

In this paper I will argue that Dewey's MPE has been significantly misinterpreted, and that this has in turn allowed distinct and contradictory contemporary moral education approaches to claim to be Deweyan in nature. I will offer an interpretation of MPE based on all of Dewey's writings on and about moral education which is consistent with Deweyan philosophy in general. It will be concluded that MPE ought not be considered Dewey's clearest or best statement on the enterprise of moral education. I will begin with a characterization of the prevalent, although incorrect, interpretation of MPE.

II.

The prevalent interpretation of MPE is exemplified by Sidney Hook, who is probably considered to be the best living[8] interpreter of Dewey. In the "Preface" to the most recent edition of MPE,[9] Hook correctly recognizes that in MPE no specific directives, only principles and insights to guide the practice of moral education, are proffered.

Nowhere in the "Preface" does Hook suggest that Dewey has written additional works on or relevant to moral education which would fill in the gaps in MPE which Hook has identified. By omission, Hook leads readers of MPE to view the work as standing apart from Dewey's theories of morals, experience

and education, as the single most authoritative and concise statement of Deweyan moral education.[9] The implication is that MPE, the only book Dewey wrote on moral education, contains the most explicit and detailed statements Dewey has to offer on moral education. In sum, Hook's "Preface" formalizes the prevalent view that MPE is the Deweyan work on moral education, capable of serving as the Deweyan source for guiding attempts to create Deweyan moral education.

Hook concludes his "Preface" with the claim that Dewey gives us no specific practical recommendations for moral education, but that his insights and principles do provide the starting points for intelligent program development.

> But how [is the practice of moral education to be achieved]? He [Dewey] does not say. Can it be done by providing models of behavior, finding and celebrating them in history, art and literature? Can situations be organized in which individuals can test themselves and learn both from their failures and their unwillingness to risk failure? We still do not know. But Dewey's approach does provide us with insights and principles that undoubtedly will enter into any proposed method of overcoming the gap between the well-intentioned commitment to intelligent policies, and their courageous and effective execution. If knowledge is to make a difference in creating a better world or resisting those forces and individuals whose actions would result in a worse world, education must find the ways.[10]

Admittedly, Dewey is not the clearest of writers. Nevertheless, unless Hook is referring only to MPE, this is a misrepresentation of Dewey. First, Dewey does say what constitutes the specifics of adequate moral education, but his view can be reconstructed only by taking his writings on moral education as a collective whole. And, second, to be consistent with Dewey's entire schema, his moral principles cannot be interpreted as being predetermined guides to practice. Rather, they must be understood as the summarization of actual Deweyan moral education practice. This is what constitutes Deweyan moral principles.

III.

According to Dewey, the task of moral theory,[11] which is identical with the task of moral education, is to locate principles which provide guidance for decision-making. However, this does not mean that principles are located prior to experimentation and practice. In distinguishing between principles and rules, Dewey explains that "a principle evolves in connection with a course of experience, being a generalized statement of what sort of consequences[12] and values tend to be realized in certain kinds of situations.

Dewey's moral principles can equivalently be termed 'hypotheses'.[13] As such, a principle "should be a hypothesis, not a dogma; something to be tried and tested, confirmed and revised in future practice, having a constant point

of growth, instead of being closed."[14] From this portrayal, we can understand why Dewey believes that the most important task of moral theory can be stated as the task of locating a methodology which will process and yield hypotheses. Dewey unquestionably offers such a methodology: the experimental or reflective method of thinking. It is not mere coincidence that both Dewey's theory of morals and his favored method of thinking are labeled 'reflective',[15] since 'reflective' and 'experimental' are interchangeable terms. Dewey claims that in reflective morality,

> the experimental method looks to past experience not for authoritative rules, but as the indispensable source of suggestions to be worked over in thought. It has respect to intelligence, not as supplying final truths and rigid rules, but as the organ of putting past experience into the form in which it is useful in the future, and projecting the plans which are to be experimentally tried out.[16]

Dewey's experimental method is like a spiral. Once hypotheses or principles are tested, they become data or means for future experimentation. This is the essence of reflective morality, for just as with Dewey's view of metaphysics, no state of affairs is ever fixed or final. Dewey argues that adopting the reflective method in a theory of morals is required if in fact morality is reflective rather than customary. As Dewey comments,

> The alternative of organic inquiry is reliance upon prejudice, partisanship, upon tradition accepted without questioning, upon the varying pressures of immediate circumstance. Adoption of an experimental course of judgment would work virtually a moral revolution in judgments and practice.[17]

It is clear, then, that Dewey's formulation of a reflective morality, and of the methodology inherent in that theory, is consistent with his overall philosophical theory of experience. Method or process, rather than the substance of morals, remains constant and supreme, just as it does in his general theory of experience. Dewey is not concerned with providing fixed answers to guide action in general. Rather, his concern is to locate a methodology which will yield hypotheses or principles which will, in turn, help guide intelligent action. The methodology is experimental, and it is the accumulation of experiences acquired through diverse situations which form the substance of moral principles.

The interconnectedness of Dewey's thought is significant at this point. Through the experimental method, generalized principles (often called 'summary rules' in contemporary moral theory) evolve, which, in turn, become the means for dealing with subsequent situations.

What does this analysis of principles, experimental method, reflective morality and so on, have to say about interpreting Dewey's MPE? The answer is significant.

IV.

The moral principles in education which Dewey outlines in MPE cannot be viewed as the starting point of contemporary moral education program development, since, as Dewey presents them in the context of MPE, they are for the most part substantively vacuous. Principles in a Deweyan analysis are not predetermined directives providing details or decisive rules for a particular practice or set of practices. Rather, true principles are equivalent to summary rules; that is, rules which have been arrived at after actual testing. We must look to other works in which Dewey's specific moral education experiments are described to find out what the principles in MPE support. By examining these other works, we find that Dewey does tell us how literature, history, and art are to be used for moral education.[18] He does detail appropriate teaching methodology, and so on. However, such descriptions of practice are not provided in MPE.

Dewey did not intend MPE to be a definitive treatise describing the practice of moral education, but rather to be a summarization of practice. What he offered was a set of principles, or summary rules, which had been arrived at by actual testing of the theory of moral experience through the practice of moral education. In this way, MPE offers those principles, or good general rules, which appear to be guidelines for determining the adequacy of any actual classroom program in moral education, past, present, or future. This interpretation renders the content of MPE virtually timeless, for Dewey has provided a more or less fixed framework of substantive principles or rules against which the specifics of practice can be aligned and judged.

This view of MPE is consistent with Dewey's formulation of the relationship between theory and practice, which must be understood as continuous and inseparable. For theory, kept in check by practice, is nothing more than the concrete evidence which directs and confirms action. By completing the reflective method through practice, the ends reached become principles or hypotheses for further testing.

In effect, then, MPE represents a set of principles, arrived at through experimentation, which are the means for guiding and judging future attempts to create moral education in the school. MPE is neither the beginning nor the end of theory making and program development. It falls somewhere in between.

This is the point at which Hook's analysis of the Deweyan concept of 'principle' becomes significantly misleading. In his "Preface," Hook is clearly suggesting that the principles and insights proffered in MPE are to be the foundation upon which contemporary moral education programs may be based--and this is exactly what the Kohlbergians and Values Clarificationists have assumed. However, Dewey was a process philosopher, and such an understanding of 'principles' is incompatible with his entire philosophical orientation.

Rather, for Dewey, 'principles' are not predetermined standards providing a decisive rule for determining practice. It is only after experimentation that a hypothesis "proves itself," and after numerous such trials, becomes a

summary rule or principle to be followed, not as a fixed standard, but as a warranted principle that may in some circumstances yield to a competing consideration. Dewey never wished to report his moral principles in terms of a fixed code of standards, for in so doing, morality and moral education would merely be regressive, rather than progressive, in nature.

Dewey's portrayal of the nature of reality, his double-barrelled view of experience, and his belief that growth is the only constant end toward which individuals strive, does not allow specific directives to be given. Dewey cannot, in MPE or in any other theoretical work, outline anything more than summary rules or principles to guide any proposed classroom practice which aims to help each individual adequately meet the challenges of continual change.[19] We are only given principles to guide further sought after ends-in-view. Hence, MPE represents the principles or results of actual experimentation of moral education, which are meant to be used to guide further experimentation and/or implementation of moral education in the schools.

This does not mean that Dewey made no choices about the specifics of practice. We can see otherwise by examining the works in which he details and describes the necessary elements of adequate moral education.[20] However, what it does mean is that Dewey's MPE is consistent with his entire philosophical theory.

V.

Dewey's moral principles in education, as they are presented in MPE, should not be seen as the principal and most explicit source for gaining insight into the specifics of Deweyan moral education. To rely on MPE as the central and most important statement of Dewey's views on moral education, is to allow virtually anything to pass as "Deweyan" moral education. The principles outlined in MPE, taken in isolation from other Deweyan literature, function as slogans; rallying cries capable of supporting diverse and contradictory practices.[21]

It would seem that both Kohlbergians and Values Clarificationists have, to a very great extent, used Dewey's moral principles as slogans rather than as serious theoretical underpinnings. Both approaches have claimed to be Deweyan, but in using Dewey's moral principles, they have neglected to look at the antecedents of those principles, such as the key notions of democracy, community, social, individual, and so on. They have neglected to examine the descriptions of The Chicago Laboratory School and other Deweyan educational experiments. Even a cursory examination of such Deweyan works would demonstrate that the moral education programs of Kohlberg and the Values Clarificationists can be Deweyan only by accepting Hook's erroneous interpretation of MPE. When MPE is properly interpreted as a generalized summary of Deweyan moral education rather than as the authoritative work of Deweyan moral education, MPE can no longer be used as confirmation for these distinctive and contradictory sorts of moral education programs.

Notes

1. Joe R. Burnett, "Whatever Happened to John Dewey?" Teachers College Record 81, 2 (Winter 1979): 192.

2. John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education. 1909. Reprint. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975).

3. For an example of the Values Clarification connection with Dewey, see Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, Values and Teaching, 2nd ed. (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 286 and 296. For an example of the Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," The Humanist (November-December 1972): 13.

4. Although Values Clarificationists use the terminology in John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: The University Press, 1939) for their moral education program, they appeal to Moral Principles in Education for confirmation of their theory. See for example, Raths, Harmin, and Simon, Values and Teaching, p. 11. Similarly Kohlbergians appeal to Moral Principles in Education, although they do cite additional Deweyan works for theory confirmation. See for example, Lawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel, "Moral Development and Moral Education," in Psychology and Educational Practice, Gerald S. Lesser, ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971), p. 413.

5. Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, pp. 57-58.

6. It is impossible to make sense of Dewey's writings specifically on moral education without a firm grasp of the theoretical underpinnings of these relatively few works. Works such as John Dewey, Experience and Nature, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1929), John Dewey, How We Think, 2nd rev. ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1933), John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938), John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1932), John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938), John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), John Dewey, Quest for Certainty (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1927), John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922), and John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education. 1913. Reprint. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975) provide the conceptual analysis and theoretical description of the terms only alluded to or used in passing in Moral Principles in Education.

7. One could easily extract a set of moral principles from Moral Principles in Education. For instance, Dewey writes that indirect rather than direct methods of teaching ought to be used in the classroom. However, since these principles are neither fixed constitutive rules nor

exhaustive as a set, identifying them is of secondary importance. Of greatest importance is to understand that principles are hypotheses themselves to be tested through subsequent practice. Those principles contained in Moral Principles in Education are merely representative examples of appropriate hypotheses for the practice of moral education.

8. Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, pp. xii-xvi.

9. The only additional Deweyan work on moral education cited by Hook in the "Preface" is John Dewey, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education," 1897, reprinted in The Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898, vol. 5, Jo Ann Boydston, ed., pp. 54-83. This article is an earlier version of Moral Principles in Education and even a cursory examination and comparison of these two works demonstrates that their content is nearly identical.

10. Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. xvi.

11. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, pp. 195-196.

12. Ibid., pp. 304-305.

13. In Human Nature and Conduct, p. 239, the relationship is stated as follows: "Principles are methods of inquiry and forecast which require verification by the event; . . . But ;the experimental character of moral judgments does not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles exist as hypotheses with which to experiment."

14. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, pp. 380-381.

15. Dewey often interchanges the words 'reflective', 'scientific', and 'experimental' as descriptors for 'method'. See for example, How We Think, Experience and Nature, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Ethics, and John Dewey, "An Analysis of Reflective Thought," The Journal of Philosophy 19, 2 (19 January 1922). Consequently, when we say that Dewey's reflective theory of morals and his reflective method of thinking both use 'reflective' we must also make the point that nothing is lost if we say that the method is the experimental method or the scientific method. The point to be made goes far beyond a simple exchange of the one word 'reflective'. We mean to point out the similarity of concepts and of the process of acquiring information.

16. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 281.

17. Ibid., pp. 275-276.

18. For such descriptive detail, see John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, 1902, and The School and Society, 1900. Rev. and combined ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards, The Dewey School, 1936. Reprint. (New

York: Atherton Press, 1966), John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1915), How We Think, and John Dewey, "The Moral Significance of the Common School Studies," 1909, reprinted in John Dewey The Middle Works 1899-1924, vol. 4 Jo Ann Boydston, ed. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), pp. 205-213. This list contains the principal works in which practice is detailed, but is not exhaustive.

19. It is assumed that Dewey intended Moral Principles in Education not to be a report or description of practice, as was The Child and the Curriculum and The School and Society, but as a discussion of the moral principles which should be experimented with in creating educational programs concerned with moral education. If we view Moral Principles in Education in this way, then Dewey is not to be faulted for neglecting to describe the specifics of practice in Moral Principles in Education. Rather, he is to be commended for providing a dozen or more clearly outlined standards, hypotheses, or principles for evaluating the adequacy of practice.

20. See for example, the works listed in footnote #18 of this paper.

21. This analysis of slogans is based upon Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education, 1960. Reprint. (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1974), pp. 36-46.

COMPETITION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

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In her recently published In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development,[1] Carol Gilligan challenges the models of human development devised by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg in which women appear deviant or morally stunted. She suggests that the moral rating system utilized by Kohlberg in particular is oriented toward a male approach to ethical issues and neglects the typical female approach to such problems. That is, Kohlberg's scale focuses on a typically-male concern for following abstract rules, but neglects a typically-female concern for preserving concrete relationships.

Gilligan goes on to draw out a scale of moral development more in tune with women's "ethic of care." She argues that men and women achieve a similar maturity, but that they come to it from different directions. Men achieve autonomy and success as they move into adulthood, but must temper that with intimacy and caring with advancing age. Women cultivate intimacy and caring in their relationships with family and friends, but must balance attachment with separation as they move to and beyond mid-life.

Gilligan's study is empirical, based on interview data. As Gilligan admits, far more data is needed to place her observations on firm ground. Still, Gilligan's is a strong voice questioning the adequacy of the widely accepted and utilized schemas of moral development proposed by Kohlberg and Piaget before him. I would like to add another questioning voice, this time a philosophical rather than an empirical one.

The general focus of this paper is the moral theory of Jean Piaget. The particular feature of Piaget's moral theory to be examined here is the role of competition in moral development. The specific questions raised with regard to the role of competition in moral development center on the philosophical soundness of Piaget's program. While the observations contained here are not directly on point with Gilligan's discussion of male-female differences in moral development, they do complement the general tenor of Gilligan's work. The assumptions about men and women, about rules and relationships, and about competition and cooperation built into theories of moral development such as Piaget's demand close scrutiny.

In The Moral Judgment of the Child,[2] Jean Piaget constructs and illustrates a framework of moral development around an activity that is inherently competitive, a game of marbles. However, his treatment of competition as a moral theme is something less than forthright, evidenced more in assumptions and seemingly contradictory statements than in any well-reasoned explanation of how competition figures either in the activity chosen or in moral development in general.

It is my contention that competition plays a dual role in Piaget's program of moral development, that Piaget refers to it both as an indispensable feature of and as an inhibitor of moral development. This is the first part of a tripartite thesis for this paper and will be demonstrated in the first section of the body of this paper.

This first contention generates a question which will result in the second and third parts of my overall thesis. The question is simple: if competition is both a feature of and an inhibitor of moral development, does this not constitute a contradiction with regard to the possibility of moral development? Two answers present themselves and will be treated in the two remaining sections of the body of this paper: 1) that this contradiction is resolved to some extent within the terms and limitations of Piaget's plan for moral development; and 2) that Piaget's partial resolution of this particular contradiction internally does not resolve all contradictions, inconsistencies and limitations regarding his use of the notion of competition in a program of moral development.

1. Piaget does not claim to be analyzing competition. References to competition and its language (win, lose, etc.) generally enter the discussion of The Moral Judgment of the Child as they are necessary to illuminate the development of the game of marbles and the child's practice of and consciousness of rules in the game situation. Some of Piaget's references to competition lead the reader to believe that it is a desirable aspect of activity and a feature (even a promotor of) moral development. Other references are less positive, even derogatory, and suggest that participation in competitive activity will prevent one from fully developing morally in Piaget's terms. Examples of each kind of reference can be outlined here.

Piaget opens the work under discussion with the unqualified statement that "(C)hildren's games constitute the most admirable social institutions," admirable above all in their complex moral system of rules (p. 13).[3] He does not clearly specify what qualifies as a "children's game," but our paradigmatic case is the game of marbles as played by little boys. Piaget takes great pains to describe marbles in all its intricacy and variety. For Piaget, this particular children's game, this most admirable social and moral institution, clearly involves competition and is controlled by rules designed to direct the game and the competition toward the emergence of and legitimation of a winner.

A child learning the game of marbles learns very early that in order to play marbles, one must draw a square. That child may not understand why the square is important to the game, but older children realize that without the square (or something serving the same purpose), the game would have no point, no challenge. There could be no winner, no one boy who hits more marbles out of the square and claims the greatest number of marbles at the end of the game.

Piaget makes much of the fact that rules for the generic game of marbles may be somewhat different in different localities, but he sees the point of the game as a constant. The game consists of putting marbles in a square and trying to take possession of them by knocking them out of the square. The game is carried on until the square is empty. The boy who has pocketed the largest number of marbles has won. Piaget describes such a boy as one who has "succeeded in winning" (p. 19), a seemingly positive appraisal, and holds great respect for the rights of the winner to hoard his winnings. If the winner refuses to redistribute the marbles and start the game anew, ". . . no law can force him to do this; he has won and there is the end of it" (p. 19). According to Piaget, the marbles collected by the winner constitute his lawfully acquired possession.

Piaget also seems to have great respect for the importance of the game and its competitive challenge in the eyes of the child participant. He discusses the instructions to the researchers that they should play seriously, but that they should allow the child to feel a certain superiority with regard to his skill in knowledge of the game. After playing, the researchers ask the child who won and why. Since Piaget's stated intention is to understand the practice of and consciousness of rules in the game of marbles, it is clear that rules and determining who won must be closely related in Piaget's mind.

The message in the above observations is simply this: Piaget describes this paradigmatic activity of moral development as one which moves through competition toward the designation of a winner and, by extention, losers. No matter how this competition is regulated by complex sorts of rules, and no matter what the importance of those rules, without the designation of a winner, there would simple be no game--at least as Piaget seems to understand it.

Beyond the simple fact that Piaget chooses a competitive activity as a prime example of moral development, there is further evidence that Piaget views competition favorably. In fact, the reader is led to believe that competition actually promotes moral development.

In the early states of the practice of rules, there is no unity (no social link, no cooperation) precisely because the child is not trying to win. The first-stage child uses the marbles and square for his own sensori-motor explorations without awareness of others' concerns or intentions. The second-stage child plays together with other children "without trying to win," or even understanding what winning means, "and therefore without attempting to unify the different ways of playing" (p. 27). Unity and cooperation (the marks of the third stage in the practice of rules) appear when winning is understood as getting the better of others (p. 42). Without this common understanding, no cooperation is possible. Piaget describes it in this way: "Each player now tries to win and all, therefore, begin to concern themselves with the question of mutual control and of unification of the rules" (p. 27).

For Piaget, cooperation is both the impetus toward and epitome of moral development. Cooperation alone leads to moral autonomy (p. 402). Yet cooperation, with regard to the game of marbles at least, is only possible based on an awareness and striving toward competing with others and winning. Without competition, our paradigmatic case of moral development seems stalled.

Piaget offers some additional evidence, the last which will be discussed here, that he views competitive behavior as a moral advance in his less than glowing account of the play of little girls. According to Piaget, "the legal sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys" (p. 77). He bases this conclusion on the observation that girls' games are simple and never present the "splendid codification" and complicated jurisprudence of marbles. These games derive their simple rules in part from the fact that they do not emphasize the designation of a winner. The process or the game seems more important to the girls than any competitive element. A rule is fair not when it legitimates a winner, but when it keeps the action of the game going, "when it's all right for playing" (p. 83).

Piaget bemoans the fact that the few girls who take any interest in a more complex game like marbles seem more concerned with achieving dexterity at the game than with the legal structure of the social institution (p. 77). Perhaps the girls are less concerned with winning and therefore do not feel a need for a complex legal structure. Piaget does not say. In any case, he clearly seems to view this lack of concern with competition and rules as a flaw in the moral development of young girls.

In spite of the foregoing discussion, Piaget is not always positive in his evaluation of competition and competitive activity. In fact, he goes beyond questioning the value of competition to suggest that participation in competitive activity will prevent one from fully developing morally.

Piaget's first mention of competition in a "lukewarm" tone comes as he introduces the transition from stage 3-P (cooperation) to stage 4-P (codification of rules) in the practice of rules, and is based on his observation of the players' attitudes toward winning. He feels that the children don't seem to value winning all that much and says that therefore "mere competition" is not what constitutes the affective-motive power of the game (p. 42), i.e., it's not the reason why the children play. "To seek to win is only to try to contend while observing common rules" (p. 42), not really to try to get the most marbles. Piaget continues to describe the transition from 3-P to 4-P: "The thing now is . . . primarily to regulate the game with a whole set of semantic rules which will ensure the most complete reciprocity in the methods used" (p. 45). These passages express Piaget's observation that, while competition may be a necessary and inevitable feature of the game, it does not in itself draw children to participate. Respect for rules provides the impetus for playing the game of marbles. Competition is not all that important.

Piaget implies a more damning criticism of competition when he maintains that competitive situations reinforce the child's spontaneous egocentrism (p. 405). Since egocentrism is characteristic of the second stage in the consciousness of rules (and second stage in practice as well), this position clearly suggests that competition inhibits full moral development.

It is important, I think, to note that when Piaget makes the above statements, he is not referring to competition in the children's game of marbles. In point of fact, he is speaking quite specifically of competitive experiences inherent in present (his present and ours) school systems. It is with reference to educational institutions that Piaget makes his only explicitly evaluative statements regarding competition.

His view of competition in educational settings is clearly negative. Competition encourages individualism and isolation and thwarts the child's "deeper psychological tendencies" toward cooperation. A competitively-oriented system may result in good grades and high scholastic achievement, but it will not develop fully autonomous young people able to enter into mature moral relationships of mutual respect. In this instance, Piaget seems to view competition as an unnatural tendency in opposition to cooperation. Cooperation is a (the) natural moral tendency in all of us, leading to full moral development. Competition inhibits such development.

What are we to make of the preceding discussion? Does Piaget suggest that competition is needed in moral development? I think that he does. And does he also maintain that competition can be destructive in terms of moral development? Again, I think that he does. Does this constitute a contradiction in his overall program of moral development? And if so, is such a contradiction damaging to the value of his work? These questions can be answered in two moments. The first focuses on the internal consistency of Piaget's theory of the states of moral development. The second focus is broader and hinges on questions relating to the assumptions on which Piaget bases his theory.

2. The preceding discussion has been unfair to Piaget in that it takes some of his statements and observations out of the context of his total theoretical framework. Various bits and pieces of his work have been, in a sense, used as "proof texts" without concern for a thorough-going exegesis of The Moral Judgment of the Child. I believe that such an approach is justified in order to highlight variant statements and seeming inconsistencies. But I also believe that such an approach is justified in order to highlight variant statements and seeming inconsistencies. But I also believe that such an approach demands a subsequent look from a more wholistic perspective at Piaget's total theory and how the theme of competition explicitly fits into that overall framework. In doing this, I suggest that we'll find that Piaget does internally provide partial resolution of the seeming contradiction and some explanation as to why his evaluation of competitive activity may very with the circumstances. Put quite simply, Piaget finds an understanding of competitive activity to be a necessary checkpoint in the path to moral development. However, it is only a

checkpoint. One who does not move beyond competition and constraint to mutual respect and cooperation does not develop morally in Piaget's term.

It is necessary here to rehearse Piaget's observed stages with regard to the practice of and the consciousness of rules among young boys who play the game of marbles. Four stages were observed with regard to the practice of rules; just three distinct stages could be identified with regard to the consciousness of rules.

In the individual-motor state of the practice of rules, the child handles the marbles at the dictation of his desires and motor habits. His behavior may be expressed in ritualized schemas, but there are no rules in a social sense. The very young child plays alone without awareness of others, of the object of the game or of the possibility of competition. Although the child plays with marbles, it would be a misnomer to say that the child plays the game of marbles.

The second, egocentric stage takes shape when the play of the child outwardly resembles the game of marbles, but the inner motivation does not match the spirit of the game. The child at this stage (2-5 years) is exposed to the structure of the game played by his elders and imitates this example with one crucial difference. The children are not trying to win in spite of the fact that they are seemingly playing together. They are really playing side-by-side with no common understanding of what it means to compete or to win. All can win at once simply by playing with the marbles and the square in whatever way they choose.

The cooperation stage (stage 3-P, 7-8 years) is crucial according to Piaget because it is at this point that the game of marbles is truly played by a number of children together in a real sense with the common object of trying to claim the most marbles by hitting them out of the square. Mutual control and unification are important questions. The rules may change from one day to the next but in order for a group to play together on any given day, there must be general agreement on the rules which will control the game and legitimate the winner. Piaget describes the value of the game of marbles at this stage: "a mutual evaluation of the competing powers which leads, thanks to the observation of common rules, to a conclusion that is accepted by all" (p. 42). If there are no "competing powers," if there is no common attempt to win, the third stage is never reached.

The fourth stage, that of the codification of the rules, differs only in degree from the third in that it too is marked by consensus about the rules governing the game. This immediate consensus becomes codification so the rules are known generally by all. Competition is a feature of a game, but one of little importance or interest. The only real interest is focused in the rules themselves, how they work and how they can be changed, and this is a cooperative rather than competitive enterprise. If the focus on competition is not abandoned in favor of a focus on cooperation, the fourth stage is never reached.

Piaget makes similar observations with regard to the consciousness of rules, outlining three stages which overlap and encompass the four stages in the practice of rules. The first C-stage is of little importance to us as it runs through the individual-motor and egocentric stages when there is no common understanding of competition anyway.

The second C-stage, unilateral respect, picks up late in the egocentric stage and extends through the first half of the cooperating stage. At this point, rules are regarded as sacred because adults are the source of rules. The child has the respect for the adult which one has for one's better, and this unilateral respect acts as a constraint on the child's use of rules. This stage encompasses the period when a common understanding of competition develops.

At the third C-stage, that of mutual consent and respect, rules are understood to originate within one's peer circle, not in some higher external source of authority. Not external constraint, but internal consent is the authority which compels behavior. This understanding of authority, this moral autonomy, arises only in cooperation with others.

For our purpose, it is important to keep in mind that this third C-stage corresponds with the late cooperating stage and the whole codification stage, a period when competition is of diminished importance. (Remember that for Piaget, a common understanding of competition is important simply to effect the transition to the third P-stage. Once cooperation is initiated, the emphasis shifts.)

One additional element must be acknowledged and discussed here in order to highlight Piaget's alternating attitude toward competition. Piaget observes his stages (four in practice, three in consciousness) develop within a particularly admirable social institution, the children's game of marbles. He seems to imply that the moral development of the children who play is complete--at least with regard to that sphere of their lives. However, he admits that this is a unique social domain that may uniquely allow full moral development. The particular condition which allows a child to reach stages 4-P and C-3 is the simple fact that older persons do not play marbles. Children of 11 and 12 may engage in mutual respect, full cooperation and moral justice because they <u>are</u> equals. They have escaped from the domination of age (p. 104). There is no occasion for the constraint which accompanies unilateral respect. There is no need for competition, for winners and losers, because, in an important sense, all are equals.

Piaget admits that this is not always the case in the social realm of adults (p. 72, 76). The adult rarely escapes the domination of age. An older generation is omnipresent.

As a result, democratic practices, moral autonomy and a well-developed sense of justice can occur in marbles where they do not occur in adult society. Society equals the sum of social relations of constraint (typical of existing, organized society) and social relations of cooperation (an ideal toward which our social system should tend). Because competition is a feature

which appears with and which is associated with social relations of constraint, it is a feature of adult society. Yet it is not a feature which Piaget favors, at least not when it is imposed on children in an education system. It is a checkpoint that must be surpassed as all of society moves toward cooperative social relations that will result in justice.

After this brief look at Piaget on his own terms, it seems clear that he does want to say that competition is both a feature of (at one point in time) and an inhibitor of (at a further point in time) of moral development. He provides an explanation of the surface contradiction as it fits in his overall theoretical framework. This may suffice within the limits of Piaget's own study, but we must look beyond those limits as well.

3. It seems to me, as I think it will seem to the reader at the close of this section, that Piaget leaves numerous questions unanswered in The Moral Judgment of the Child, some of them directly related to his understanding of and use of the theme of competition. Because these questions go unanswered, his two-sided view of competitive activity remains somewhat contradictory.

The first question is quite simple: Why does Piaget choose the game of marbles with its complex system of rules as the paradigmatic moral activity? Why choose a game in which the components become the private property of the winner? Why choose a competitive activity at all? Why not a cooperative, creative activity? Piaget seems to feel that the common understanding of winning is the turning point in developing a moral sensibility. A common understanding may well be vital, but could it not be a creative rather than a competitive understanding?

Interestingly enough, Piaget offers some evidence that this is true although he doesn't recognize it as such. I refer to his observations of the play of girls who do seem to go through stages of moral development similar to those of boys, who do seem to develop a common understanding (to keep the game going and all players participating), but who don't become truly competitive as Piaget seems to think is necessary. It may be that Piaget's observed stages are quite accurate but that competition is not a necessary checkpoint. Competitive activity may not be the only or the best activity for the development of moral autonomy.

A second question is generated by the first: Why are rules the best expression of morality? If cooperation is a "deeper psychological tendency" pointing us toward mutual respect and justice, why is there a need for rules at all? Piaget does not answer this question, although it does seem that rules are in some way intertwined with competition. (In section 1, I made note of the fact that in order to find out what the child thought about rules, Piaget asked who won and why.)

It seems clear to me that rules are needed because there is a benefit (marbles, status, whatever) for distribution. If equal distribution were the

intention, the marbles would be counted out evenly after the game no matter who hit the most out of the square. But Piaget is quite certain that the winner's marbles are his possession. Rules are needed to legitimize winning, i.e., in agreeing to play by the rules, the participants also agree to accept the results.

Piaget may not admit this, but the children understand. By the age of 10 (at the time competition comes to be understood), rules become the necessary condition for agreement. Rules prevent quarreling and winning unfairly (p. 71), but they are needed primarily because winning and losing are part of the game. Perhaps this is why girls' games are marked by few rules: winning and losing are less important.

If rules are the best expression of morality, and rules arise primarily in competitive situations, then is competition always a necessary feature of morality? I don't think Piaget would answer yes. An alternative is to say that rules are not the best expression of morality, but I doubt that Piaget would sacrifice that point so easily. We are left with a contradiction.

A third question relates to Piaget's negative remarks regarding competition in educational institutions: Why is competition in school negative and competition in marbles is positive? Why does one thwart moral development and the other encourage it? It seems to me that there is an answer here although Piaget doesn't give it.

Perhaps competition in school is negative with regard to moral development because it is regulated by adults. This subjects the child to Piaget's domination of ages at all points in his schooling experience (he is also subject to various kinds of social reinforcement and conditioning) and, therefore, true social cooperation remains impossible. Competition in marbles is not necessarily negative because the child will eventually reach the stage of mutual respect (without external messages regarding the value or rewards of competition) and shift focus away from winning and losing as such.

I think it quite unfortunate that Piaget doesn't deal with this explicitly in part because it leaves his theory open to question and in part because this seems to be a very fruitful point on which to turn an entire discussion of the nature, function and effects of competition generally. The role of adults in the competitive experiences of children is a crucial question.

All three of the above question-clusters leave Piaget's understanding of and position regarding competition in moral development less than clear.

4. I am left then with my original thesis pretty much intact: that Piaget refers to competition as both an indispensable feature of and an inhibitor of moral development. That this contradiction is partially resolved in terms of Piaget's overall theoretical framework, but that Piaget does not resolve all of the inconsistencies and limitations regarding his use of the notion of competition.

Although I have chosen not to emphasize the specifics in the body of this paper, it should be clear that some of the inconsistencies and limitations in Piaget's work evident from a philosophical perspective complement the inadequacies evident from Carol Gilligan's empirical, psychological perspective. Gilligan wonders about the relative importance of rules versus relationships in moral development and reasoning. So do I. Gilligan notes that an emphasis on competition and individual success results in a different, though not clearly better, scale of moral development, than an emphasis on cooperation and creativity. So do I. It is still a feature of our contemporary world that competition, individual success, and regard for abstract rules tend to be associated with male behavior, and that cooperation, creativity and regard for concrete relationships tend to be associated with female behavior. There are some questions associated with the role of competition in moral development which neither Piaget nor Gilligan address, and which point the way toward further reflection and discussion. Are these differences between men and women inevitable? Is the dominance of a competitive model inevitable? And if the answers to either of these questions is yes, then the further question arises as to why this is so. Does the competitive impulse which appears disproportionately in men and which figures prominently in our social and moral institutions arise out of the constant of human nature or out of the exigencies of a particular social order? If we ever answer that question, we will have a better handle on just what morality is and on what it means to develop morally.

Notes

1. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 1982).

2. Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. Marjorie Gabain (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975).

3. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child. Subsequent page references found in the text of this paper refer to The Moral Judgment of the Child.

COMPETING CULTURAL IDEALS FOR THE SCHOOL: LIBERAL EDUCATION AND MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION*

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Until fairly recently, there was a general consensus, both among educators and the public, about the cultural function which the school was expected to play in our society. Briefly, the school was to prepare children for responsible adult life in society by serving, in Harry Broudy's words, In loco communitatis to teach and ensure the inculcation of community mores and morals in its charges.[1] Further, the school was to make possible the exposure of the young to the sciences and humanities writ large (representing "the best that man had thought and wrought and said"[2]) by acting in loco humanitatis.[3] This understanding of the cultural role of the school can be seen in practice in the "Great Books" approach to education, in the curricular reforms at Harvard University in the 1970s,[4] and in Mortimer Adler's Paideia Proposal,[5] to mention just a few cases.

This was to be accomplished through what has traditionally been called "liberal education," or what came to be called "general education" in modern school parlance.[6] The end result of such an education was to be, loosely speaking, an individual along the lines of the Peters-Hirst ideal of the "educated person."[7]

This ideal, which assumed a unified, fairly distinct transnational (although clearly a Western) "culture," dominated discussion in philosophical circles throughout the English-speaking world for a considerable period of time, and is still considered cogent and significant enough to draw the unflattering attention of a variety of critics, the most vociferous of whom are probably the Marxists[8] and feminists.[9]

In the United States, this view of the cultural function of the school began coming under attack in the late 1960s as the ideology of cultural pluralism[10] gained adherents in both minority groups and the liberal establishment. The "WASP" cultural domination of the schools was denounced; cultural, linguistic, and often (although usually implicitly) ethical relativism came to be the new "watch-words" in educational circles.[11] In the public schools themselves, this initially resulted in a number of positive and beneficial changes, including an increased awareness of discriminatory school practices, a sensitivity to sexism and racism in textbooks and other curricular materials, a recognition of the need for increased minority representation (both in terms of teachers and administrators) on school staffs, and so on. It also entailed the rise of various sorts of "ethnic studies" and "ethnic awareness" programs, as well as that of bilingual education programs for children from non-English speaking backgrounds.[12]

In recent years, we have seen the rise of a significantly outgrowth of these programs--specifically, the development of multicultural education programs. The advocates of such programs[13] begin with the recognition of the culturally and linguistically diverse nature of our society, and, arguing from positions which invariably assert (or implicitly assume) relativist arguments of various sorts, conclude that the schools should work to foster this diversity, as well as toleration for and understanding of other cultural and linguistic groups.[14] Entailed herein as well, of course, are a broad variety of curricular ramifications for public schooling in American society.

In this paper, it will be suggested that these two apparently competing conceptions of the cultural function of the school may not be mutually exclusive--or, at the very least, perhaps not quite so exclusive as might initially appear to be the case. By distinguishing first between the different conceptions of "culture" being employed, and second, between cultural "process" and "product" goals in education, a middle ground will be suggested.

Conceptions of "Culture"

At the heart of the difference between what will here be termed the "liberal" and the "multicultural" cultural ideals are dramatically different uses of the term "culture" itself. Indeed, it may prove to be the case that the assumption of radically different conceptions of "culture" in the two competing ideals may have the effect of making them appear to be less reconcilable than, in fact, they actually are.

The "liberal" cultural ideal, espoused by Broudy and, at least implicitly, by both Peters and Hirst, is concerned with what might be termed "high culture" (that is, haute culture). Culture, understood in this sense, refers to the single, universal culture of humanity, as embodied in the best of our art, music, literature, and so on. In the case of the educated individual, this means, as Whitehead noted in his famous essay on "The Aims of Education," that:

> Culture is activity of thought, and receptiveness to beauty and humane feeling.[15]

This is the sense of "culture" which we have in mind when we describe someone as a "cultured" individual; it is also the sense conveyed when we refer to the opening of the Opera season at the Met as a "cultural" event. Precluded from this sense, I think, would be the use of the term in a statement such as, "A more relaxed approach to human interaction is a component of culture X."

The "multicultural" conception of culture, on the other hand, is far more concerned with what might be identified as the anthropological sense of the term. Here the term "culture" is being used to convey a much broader concept, one which includes:

> . . . that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.[16]

This is the sense of "culture" which we have in mind when we discuss child-raising practices in different cultures,[17] differences in communication styles (the non-competitive Navaho style is commonly contrasted with that of the highly competitive Anglo community), eating habits, sex-role expectations, and so forth. Using the anthropological sense of "culture" allows us to include Cervantes, cinco de mayo activities, and so forth, as components of the latino child's cultural heritage. Such a broadly-conceived understanding of the term "culture" has many clear pedagogic advantages, but doesn't really help us in evaluating the various components of the child's culture--left to itself, this conception of "culture" requires that we accept each component of the "culture" as a "given," just as must be the culture as a whole accepted.[18]

This brings us to the central weakness of the anthropological usage of the term "culture": its reliance on the doctrine of cultural relativism. Many of the problems inherent in such a relativist position have been amply detailed by Ennis,[19] Broudy,[20] and others.[21] Without going into unnecessary detail here, let me just note that, whatever the benefits of such a doctrine for education (and it does have many, I believe), all too often it has been used by educators and others to avoid making difficult decisions which could have been, and indeed needed to be, made. This, it should be noted, is true regardless of the merits of various sorts of relativism. Cultures, in the anthropological sense, can in fact be compared and evaluated--and such comparison and evaluation need not, ipso facto, be ethnocentric, just as Dell Hymes has argued that languages can, in fact, be compared and evaluated.[22] More to the point here, however, is the fact that we can contrast "culture" in its "liberal" sense favorably with any anthropological culture as an educational ideal.

This is not meant, however, to suggest that the anthropological sense of "culture" has no role to play in the school; quite the contrary is the case. The problem with which we are faced is to find a way to best utilize the positive pedagogical features of the construct without, in the process, falling prey to an essentially indefensible relativism.

"Process" and "Product" Goals in Education

Some years ago, Stanton Teal and Gerald Reagan distinguished between two kinds of educational goals--procedural, or "restriction-of-manner," goals (which for the sake of brevity will be called "process goals" here), and "desired result," or product, goals.[23] As they note,[24] both of these kinds of goals are crucial to the process of education. The two are, nonetheless, quite distinct, and we must be careful to note and remain aware of the distinction. Their example of this is that:

> . . . most of us believe that there should . . . be some educational results, some outcomes of schooling that increase the student's capacity to deal with his world. As principles of procedure (process goals), almost all of us would accept the notion of treating children humanely and fairly. But such treatment is not the desired result (i.e., the product goal), but a restriction on us as we attempt to bring about the desired result.[25]

To take this one step further, it should be noted that we can speak of product goals in two distinct ways. On the one hand, we may have in mind what have been termed "school outcomes," which might, for instance, include reading Shakespeare in school. On the other hand, we may have something broader in mind, which can be called "life outcomes." As Broudy notes,

> Naturally one hopes that school outcomes will produce life outcomes; one hopes that reading Shakespeare in school will result in going to Shakespearean plays in life . . .[26]

One hopes, yes - but we cannot be sure, since the matter is not, as Broudy observes, really testable.[27] For our purposes here, however, the distinction is not a crucial one. It does need to be stressed, though, that it is in the latter sense of the term that we will be discussing product goals in the analysis which follows. At this point, we can turn to a brief examination of the "multicultural" and "liberal" cultural ideals in light of this process/product distinction.

The central concern in multicultural education programs has been, and continues to be, an essentially affective rather than cognitive one. Educators in such programs have tended to emphasize self-esteem, ethnic identity, overcoming feelings of rejection and/or ambivalence, and so forth, in minority populations. To be sure, multicultural education programs have dealt with cognitive issues as well, and a variety of quite diverse curricular developments can be attested to. However, these have generally been seen, unless I am quite mistaken, as means to an end rather than as ends in and of themselves. In short, multicultural education programs have been used as process goals toward the product goal of a pluralistic society.

As process goals, designed to help children from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds adjust to the school and dominant society, it is hard to imagine reasonable objections to multicultural education programs. As process goals functioning to expose Anglo-American children to the cultural and linguistic diversity of which our society is composed, in the hopes of generating greater understanding and tolerance, again objections would probably be few. Indeed, Richard Pratte recently noted that, given what he terms a "modified unrestricted" argument for it,

> . . . multicultural education (can be) viewed as extremely well suited to encourage the goal of developing informed, committed, and responsible citizens for a democratic political community. The best

> programs of citizenship education--including curriculum, methods, governance of schools, community participation, and all the rest--can be profitably explored and taught through such vehicles as cultural diversity, cultural pluralism, racism, sexism, ageism, the parity of power, etc.[28]

However, this in no way necessarily entails an acceptance of the related product goal (that is, of a pluralistic society), nor of the relativism which underlies and undergirds it. As a process goal, multicultural education can be seen as not simply not in opposition to, but actually supportive of, the sort of product goal implicit in the ideal of the liberally educated person. Properly employed, such programs can furnish the initial preparation which is to be followed by the "general education" which can, on Broudy's account, lead to that all too rare commodity--the enlightened citizen.[29]

It is now necessary for us to turn briefly to an examination of the "liberal" cultural ideal as a product goal. What we are, in essence, concerned with here is what Peters has called the "emergence of an educated person,"[30] and entails, roughly, the initiation of the individual into the various "forms of knowledge" discussed by Hirst.[31] A large part of this, of course, involves the recognition that all knowledge is not of equal worth, as well as the ability to evaluate the value of different pieces of information. As Broudy explains,

> . . . not all items of knowledge are equally satisfying or useful. For example, I do not at the moment know how many sheep there are in Australia. I do know that the economy of Australia . . . involve(s) sheep grazing. The first item leaves me cold; the second somewhat warmer.[32]

More is entailed in initiation into the "forms of knowledge" than simply acquiring bits of information, however. Indeed, there would appear to be little significant difference between Hirst's conception of the "forms of knowledge" and Broudy's concern with:

> . . . the symbolic skills to penetrate the contents of the disciplines . . . the selected contents (concepts, relations, modes of inquiry, problems) of the basic disciplines, and . . . the forms and skills of inquiry.[33]

By ensuring the acquisition of such skills, etc. (a "school outcome"), we do as much as we probably can as educators to make possible that "receptiveness to beauty and humane feeling" which is, it will be recalled, central to Whitehead's definition of "culture" (the "life outcome"). Such, then, can be understood to be the product goal of the "liberal" cultural ideal.

Conclusion

It has been suggested here that the educational ideals of liberal education and multicultural education may, at least to a limited extent, be seen as complementary product and process goals. This allows the adoption of the positive pedagogical features of the anthropological sense of "culture" found in multicultural education, as well as the benefits of the "liberal" cultural ideal. Further, it entails the rejection of a basically indefensible relativism (both cultural and ethical in nature) as a product of our educational system.

A few comments are in order at this point to make clear what is not being argued here. Accepting the "liberal" cultural ideal as a viable and desirable goal for public education is in no way the same as urging a return to the old Anglo-Conformity model of schooling which dominated American education for so long.[34] The days of Anglo-American cultural domination of the schools are gone, at least in large part, and this is for the best. What we need to do now is to work to create defensible, sensitive teaching methods and curricular materials which will help all students to become truly "educated persons."

Notes

* I am grateful to Harry Broudy for his generous help and support during the writing of this paper.

1. Harry S. Broudy, The Real World of the Public Schools (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), pp. 46-47.

2. Ibid., p. 48.

3. See ibid., pp. 48-53.

4. See Phyllis Keller, Getting at the Core: Curriculum Reform at Harvard (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

5. Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto (New York: Macmillan, 1982).

6. See Harry S. Broudy, "Liberal Arts and Liberal Education," in his Paradox and Promise (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 49-60.

7. See, for example, Paul H. Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," reprinted in his Knowledge and Curriculum (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, pp. 30-53; R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (Atlanta: Scott Foresman, 1967), pp. 9-11; and R. S. Peters, "Aims of Education--A Conceptual Inquiry," in R. S. Peters The Philosophy of Education (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 18-21.

8. For instance, Michael R. Matthews, The Marxist Theory of Schooling: A Study of Epistemology and Education (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 157-174.

9. Especially of interest in this context is Jane Roland Martin, "The Ideal of the Educated Person," in Philosophy of Education: 1981, ed. Daniel R. DeNicola(Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1982), pp. 3-20.

10. For an excellent analysis of the various ideological alternatives to cultural diversity, see Richard Pratte, "Five Ideologies of Cultural Diversity and Their Curricular Ramifications," in Philosophy of Education: 1979, ed. Gary Fenstermacher (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1980), pp. 264-278. See also Broudy, The Real World of the Public Schools, pp. 47-48.

11. There is even a sense in which one could label Hirst a relativist. For example, he argues that rationality is constituted by certain things (concepts, inferences, etc.) which change historically. This suggests

that the change cannot be rationally assessed, since the very constituents of rationality change. This position can be contrasted to that of Dewey, for instance, who believed that some of the constituents of rationality are not subject to historical change (such as physiology, natural environment, etc.), and further, that those that do change do so in an understandable way, and the understanding of that way is admissible as part of rationality.

12. It should be noted, however, that a convincing argument can be made for the claim that bilingual education programs are basically assimilatory in nature. See Timothy Reagan, "Bilingual Education: A Reevaluation of Objectives," Journal of the Midwest History of Education Society 8 (1980): 15-25.

13. See, for example, Donna M. Gollnick and Philip C. Chinn, Multicultural Education in a Pluralistic Society (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1983); Ricardo L. Garcia, Teaching in a Pluralistic Society: Concepts, Models, Strategies (New York: Harper & Row, 1982); and Carl A. Grant, ed., Multicultural Education (Washington, DC: ASCD, 1977).

14. See Gollnick and Chinn, Multicultural Education in a Pluralistic Society; and Garcia, Teaching in a Pluralistic Society.

15. Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education (New York: Mentor Books, 1949), p. 13.

16. Quoted in James A. Clifton, Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 5.

17. See Muriel Saville-Troike, A Guide to Culture in the Classroom (Rosslyn, VA: National Clearinghouse for Bilingual Education, 1978), p. 7.

18. See, for example, Garcia, Teaching in a Pluralistic Society, pp. 9-16.

19. Robert H. Ennis, Logic in Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 412-418.

20. Harry S. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 129-131.

21. See, for example, Robin Barrow and Ronald Woods, An Introduction to Philosophy of Education, 2nd ed. (New York: Methuen, 1982), pp. 158-180. Barrow and Woods comment that, "we must not confuse the fact that cultural standards are hard to determine and sometimes difficult to reach agreement on, with the assumption that anything between hard covers is as good as anything else between hard covers" (p. 180).

22. Dell Hymes, "Review of Noam Chomsky," reprinted in On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays, ed. Gilbert Harman (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 318.

23. Stanton M. Teal and Gerald M. Reagan, "Educational Goals," in A School for Tomorrow, ed. Jack R. Frymier (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1973), pp. 37-84. Also helpful here is Jo Ann Freiberg, John Dewey: Theory and Practice of Moral Education (Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1982), pp. 274-284.

24. Teal and Reagan, "Educational Goals," p. 43.

25. Ibid.

26. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education, p. 348.

27. Ibid.

28. Richard Pratte, "Multicultural Education: Four Normative Arguments," Educational Theory 33, 1 (Winter 1983): forthcoming.

29. See Harry S. Broudy, Truth and Credibility: The Citizen's Dilemma (New York: Longman, 1981), chapter 11.

30. R. S. Peters, "Education and the Educated Man," in A Critique of Current Educational Aims, eds. R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 1-16.

31. See Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge."

32. See Harry S. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954), p. 184.

33. See Harry S. Broudy, "Educational Unity in a Pluralistic Society," in Critical Issues in Educational Policy, ed. Louis Rubin (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1980), pp. 14-24, quote from p. 22.

34. See Timothy G. Reagan, Language, Ideology and Education (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1982), pp. 36-37, for a discussion of the Anglo-Conformity model of assimilation.

DEWEY'S THEORY OF INQUIRY: PROBLEMS OF FOUNDATIONS

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Dewey, so one could argue, had mainly two aims to which his work was dedicated. First, he wanted to dissolve traditional philosophical dualisms; second, he was concerned with sketching a culture which, as Rorty[1] puts it, "would not continually give rise to new versions of the old problems, because it would no longer make the distinctions between Truth, Goodness, and Beauty which engender such problems."

Dewey hoped that scientific inquiry would, if considered as adapting to rather than copying reality, show the continuity between science, ethics, and art. In advocating the logic of inquiry, Dewey pleaded for experiment and argued against dogmatism; he emphasized the importance of empirical evidence and held it against beliefs in moral and political axioms. The impact and significance of his pragmatic theory of inquiry must be considered against the background of a society

> in which morals were a product of respectable conventions and orthodox religious creeds; in which the turbulence of industrial relations and the wretchedness of millions of workers were excused and explained by references to the eternal verities of human nature and the sacred absolutes of private property; in which education was an exercise in rote learning and copybook maxims; in which the cultural life of the majority was local and insulated, and cut off from metropolitan and cosmopolitan influences.[2]

In the realm of philosophy, Dewey argued, such classic dualisms as "individual versus society," "value versus fact," and "theory versus practice" can only be overcome when we abandon the "common element" confidently presupposed by traditional philosophies. We must, he urged, "advance to a belief in a plurality of changing, moving, individualized goals and ends, and to a belief that principles, criteria, laws are intellectual instruments for analyzing individual or unique situations."[3] By focusing on specific situations we would, so Dewey hoped, finally develop effective methods of inquiry for tackling the problems at hand. Science, which is to be employed for the improvement of specific social conditions would, he thought, become humanistic in quality:

> When the consciousness of science is fully impregnated with the consciousness of human value, the greatest dualism which now weighs humanity down, the split between the material, the mechanical, the scientific, and the moral and ideal will be destroyed.[4]

Impressed with the progress of the natural sciences, but also aware of their technological exploitation in the pecuniary order, Dewey inquired: "Is it possible for the scientific attitude to become such a weighty and widespread constituent of culture that, through the medium of culture, it may shape human desires and purposes?"[5] If the scientific attitude were to become effective in this way, science must not be used as a mere tool to achieve set purposes. Dewey argued that these purposes themselves have to be subjected to analysis. Ends are for him always "ends-in-view" and never "ends-in-themselves." We cannot assume that "'ends' can be valued apart from appraisal of the things used as means in obtaining them."[6] For Dewey, there are no fixed absolute values. Adopting the Darwinian evolutionary standpoint, he believed that when circumstances change, attitudes, beliefs, and institutions should change accordingly. Change would be guided by inquiry into facts and possible consequences rather than by established dogma.

Dewey saw clearly that science was subverting traditional institutions and modes of production as well as the conditions and contents of human experience. Traditional sources of authority were being challenged, and new ones had to be found. The void could only be filled, Dewey thought, by reconstructing the foundations of moral and social beliefs in terms of the scientific attitude. Relatively late in his career he wrote, ". . . scientific method is the only means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live."[7]

Considering just how confident Dewey was in the efficacy of the scientific attitude regarding social problems, one commentator notes, "Dewey's trust in science gives a bit of the feeling of listening to a Strauss waltz, a melody from the time when the world was young."[8] While one may agree with the sentiment expressed, one should not overlook that Dewey did attempt to tackle some rather large and weighty philosophical problems by developing his theory of inquiry.

Of the two aims which I think guided his investigations I want to address primarily the first which can be considered the "smaller" of the two. Dewey's theory of (social) inquiry, so I will argue, does not escape the problems of traditional epistemologies and hence, dualism. However, while I consider this to be the case, it is also argued that he came rather close to putting an end to traditional epistemology. The reason why Dewey did not succeed in this task lies in the fact that he finally grounds human knowledge "in nature" rather than accepting the notion of human social practices as the sole grounds on which knowledge claims are justified.

In the following, I consider Dewey's conception of the theory of (social) inquiry, then raise the issue of Dewey's naturalism, and finally examine some of its implications. Dewey believes that, broadly speaking, the social sciences are branches of natural science.[9] In comparison with the latter, social inquiry is characterized as a backward science, a definition which is not to imply in Dewey's view that it can ever become a science in the sense that physics is (Logic, p. 487).[10] The question is for Dewey "whether it is

such as to permit of the development of methods which, as far as they go, satisfy the logical conditions that have to be satisfied in other branches of inquiry" (Logic, p. 487).

It is of considerable import that Dewey maintains that social inquiry takes place within a cultural matrix which is defined and determined by the nature of social relations. Hence, the kinds of problems inquiry addresses, and the techniques for problem-solving, are relative to a particular state of material and intellectual culture. While the impact of cultural conditions on inquiry is very strong, Dewey maintains that vested interests in the development of physical science are less noticeable in contemporary society (1939) than in previous centuries. He attributes this to the development of specialized subject-matters and techniques, a development which in turn emphasizes the relative independence of the "physical" from the "social." He stresses their relative independence but warns that the complete separation of science from the social environment is a fallacy which encourages the scientist to be irresponsible regarding the social consequences of his work. It is those very consequences, in Dewey's view, which determine the nature of scientific inquiry (Logic, p. 490).

The validity of knowledge and the progress of science ultimately rest on agreement of activities and their consequences by the scientific community. This conclusion, Dewey maintains, is in "harmony with the position that the ultimate end and test of all inquiry is the transformation of a problematic situation (which involves confusion and conflict) into a unified one" (Logic, p. 491).[11] While he realizes how difficult this aim is in social inquiry, he insists that the problem is a practical rather than an inherent logical or theoretical one.

The fact that the methods of social inquiry have to be developed analogously to those employed in physical science means concretely that the former have to establish methods of observing, discriminating, and arranging data that evoke and test correlated ideas. It also means that ideas formed, in Dewey's view, are to serve as hypotheses, and are of a form to direct and prescribe operations of analytic-synthetic determination of facts. In addition, the whole field and constitution of social phenomena have to be considered an important theoretical task. By this Dewey means that no matter what particular actions we carry out, we always interact with physical conditions. The theoretical significance of this is "that social phenomena cannot be understood except as there is prior understanding of physical conditions and the laws of their interactions. Social phenomena cannot be attacked, qua social, directly" (Logic, p. 492).

Dewey argues that we need extensive physical knowledge before we can resolve complex social phenomena into simpler forms. While physical inquiry already possesses a store of scientific data, conceptions, and methods, the material of social inquiry still exists in a "crude qualitative state." Hence, he argues, "The problem of institution of methods by which the material of existential situations may be converted into the prepared materials which

facilitate and control inquiry is, therefore, the primary and urgent problem of social inquiry" (Logic, p. 493).

We must remember here that Dewey wishes to emphasize strongly his opposition to logical positivism.[12] In fact, he states clearly that positivist social inquiry misses the point since it is reduced to ascertaining "the best method" for an already "fixed" problem. What is foregone in this conception is "the work of analytic discrimination, which is necessary to convert a problematic situation into a set of conditions forming a definite problem" (Logic, p. 493).

The problem of perfecting techniques of analytic observation and comparison in social inquiry is compounded by the fact that social problems tend to be interpreted in moral terms. Dewey emphasizes that social problems are indeed moral regarding their causes and consequences, but Dewey notes that we should not conclude that all evaluative procedures are to be ruled out. While he agrees with empiricist social science's abstention from evaluations understood as "moral condemnation and approbation," he points out that this is not the only sense of "evaluation." What Dewey has in mind is the kind of evaluation which satisfies the logical conditions of judgment, and which institutes means and consequences in strict relation to each other. Ends must always be evaluated on the basis of available means through which they can be realized. Ends-in-view are, on Dewey's account, themselves means and are logically indispensable in inquiry.

Dewey explicitly rejects the notion that facts are just "there" and that all we need to do is to observe them accurately and to assemble them in sufficient number in order to warrant generalizations. At least formally, Dewey recognizes the theory-ladenness of observation: "A generalization in the form of a hypothesis is a prerequisite condition of selection and ordering of material as facts. A generalization is quite as much an antecedent of observation and assemblage of facts as it is a consequence of observing and assembling them" (Logic, p. 498).

How does Dewey define the "problems" of social inquiry? A problem is a genuine one for investigation when it is set by an actual social situation which is confused and conflicting. Dewey points out that the problems of inquiry are intellectualizations of real, practical, and troubled situations. He warns that any problem of scientific inquiry which does not grow out of actual social conditions is factitious. We are again reminded that no matter how careful we are in observing and recording, we can only understand these observations in terms of projected consequences of activities. In summary, problems, in order to satisfy the conditions of scientific method, must "(1) grow out of actual social tensions, needs, 'troubles'; (2) have their subject-matter determined by the conditions that are material means of bringing about a unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, which is a plan and policy for existential resolution of the conflicting social situation" (Logic, p. 499).

It appears from the preceding discussion that facts for Dewey are facts in the logical sense only as they contribute to defining a problem and a possible solution. He reminds us that the transformation of a problematic situation is effected by interaction of specifically discriminated existential conditions, and that facts have to be determined in their dual function as obstacles and as resources. In order to clear up a confused situation, it is necessary to eliminate its negative factors and to release and order the positive ones in the direction of the desired consequences. This kind of discrimination between adverse and favorable conditions in an existing situation is a mode of observation which Dewey calls "realistic social thinking" (Logic, p. 500).

Since inquiry into social phenomena involves evaluations, and consequently competing interpretations, there are also always alternative possible ends which can emerge from an analyzed problematic situation. Social inquiry which satisfies the conditions of scientific method must judge certain objective consequences to be the end which is worth attaining under given conditions. Dewey means by this "that ends in their capacity of values can be validly determined only on the basis of the tensions, obstructions and positive potentialities that are found, by controlled observation, to exist in the actual situation" (Logic, p. 503).

For Dewey, the most important problem in social, and other areas of inquiry is that certain conceptual structures and frames of reference are taken for granted and remain unexamined. He argues that these often implicitly existing conceptions must be translated into formulated propositions and be made available to critical examination. It is also detrimental to the development of social inquiry that there exist so many separate social disciplines which means that social phenomena are compartmentalized and thus effectively divided. What is needed, according to Dewey, is a breaking down of conceptual barriers. While there are considerable practical difficulties in applying the experimental method to social phenomena, Dewey emphasizes that

> every measure of policy put into operation is, logically, and should be actually of the nature of an experiment. For (1) it represents the adoption of one out of a number of alternative conceptions as possible plans of action, and (2) its execution is followed by consequences which, while not as capable of definite or exclusive differentiation as in the case of physical experimentation, are none the less observable within limits, so they may serve as tests of the validity of the conception acted upon. The idea that because social phenomena do not permit the controlled variation of sets of conditions in a one-by-one series of operations, therefore, the experimental method has no application at all, stands in the way of taking advantage of the experimental method to the extent that is practicable (Logic, p. 508-509).

Dewey describes his theory of inquiry as "naturalistic." By this he means that the foundations of inquiry are rooted in biological functions and structures which are necessary although not sufficient conditions. He expresses his main argument regarding the foundations of inquiry thus:

> The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activities and forms. The idea of continuity is not self-explanatory. But its meaning excludes complete rupture on one side and more repetition of identities on the other; it precludes reduction of the "higher" to the "lower" just as it precludes complete breaks and gaps. (Logic, p. 23)

As was pointed out earlier, Dewey want to clear away a lot of the dead wood of traditional philosophy; but he also wanted to do it by applying his own scientific-empirical method in philosophy. He attempted to supersede logical empiricism, rationalism, idealism, and not to forget, Marxism, by proposing what Rorty calls "epistemological behaviorism."[15] This kind of behaviorism is connected with the Skinnerian or Watsonian kind only by name. Epistemological behaviorism does not presuppose any idealist metaphysics, rather its essence consists in "Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former."[16]

Anyone who is interested in the question of the foundations of human knowledge might, of course, ask whether epistemological behaviorism does not beg the question altogether, a consideration which raises yet another issue: Are we allowed to treat the notion of human knowledge as merely the study of certain ways in which human beings interact, or do we require an ontological foundation? We only require the latter if we presuppose Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic truths on the one hand, and the doctrine of the "sense data" on the other. If, however, we are content to replace the notion of Truth, for example, with what Dewey calls "warranted assertibility"[15] we also give up the notion that there is more to knowledge than can be ascertained through the social practices of justification. Hence, adoption of the standpoint of the epistemological behaviorist means that we do not give certain kinds of explanations. However, the argument does not primarily concern the adequacy of explanation of fact, but, as Rorty points out,

> rather whether a practice of justification can be given a "grounding" in fact. The question is not whether human knowledge in fact has "foundations," but whether it makes sense to suggest that it does--whether the idea of epistemic or moral authority having a "ground" in nature is a coherent one.[16]

In his theory of inquiry, Dewey correctly emphasizes that justification is social in character and dependent on the community of inquirers. But, and her I think, his naturalism becomes metaphysical, he is not content with leaving it in the social realm of justification, but anchors it "in nature." He wanted to say that to gain knowledge is to solve problems in a temporal and contingent manner. He ended up creating a different, permanent, and neutral matrix for inquiry, a matrix which closely resembles traditional metaphysics. The reason why Dewey's naturalism turns metaphysical lies in the fact that he attempted to serve both Locke and Hegel. Rorty[17] is correct in stating that

> Nobody can claim to offer an "empirical" account of something called "the inclusive integrity of 'experience'," nor take this "integrated unity as the starting point for philosophic thought,"[21] if he also agrees with Hegel that the starting point of philosophic thought is bound to be the dialectical situation in which one finds oneself caught in one's own historical period.

It appears that Dewey merges two distinct and separate discourses: that in which we describe the causal antecedents of knowledge, and the discourse in which we make justificatory claims regarding the validity of our knowledge. Dewey attempted to overcome traditional epistemologies by shifting the locus of the foundations of knowledge thus rephrasing Kant's guiding question: How is reliable knowledge possible? But he remained too close to Kant's categories in order to successfully eliminate the very assumption that justification must have foundations other than those rooted in social practices and needs. It was not necessary to postulate "continuities" between "lower" and "higher" activities and forms, between nervous systems and people, or between "experience and nature." Both lines of thought, the naturalistic and the historicist, can indeed coexist without interfering with each other. It is possible to argue with Locke that the causal processes within the organism are sufficient to explain the acquisition of knowledge. On the other hand, one can adopt Hegel's notion which maintains that the rational criticism of knowledge-claims is always shaped in terms of the problems faced by human beings at a specific time in history.[18] If both strands are kept separate, it is at least analytically possible to prevent the traditional problems of epistemology. But Dewey did want his cake and eat it too; he want to unite psychology and metaphysics. This merger took the form of the vocabulary of the Darwinian biologist, a vocabulary Dewey employed to describe everything that could ever count as knowledge.

Dewey applied himself to problems of "liberalism," "democracy," "individualism," and "education," to name but a few. While his evolutionary-biological viewpoint allows him to identify the above as problems, their origin is considered to be located in the "old order," meaning the time which was not yet impregnated with the scientific attitude. This means in turn that Dewey does not recognize the "political" and the "social" as categories in their own right but as "derivatives" of the "physical." This observation seems to be born out when we consider Dewey's treatment of conflict and power in modern mass society, issues which he confronts only formally. In a statement made in 1935,[19] he shows himself acutely aware of the distribution of power in the United States: "That the control of the means of production by the few in legal possession operates as a standing agency of coercion of the many, may need emphasis in statement, but is surely evident to one who is willing to observe and honestly report the existing scene." While he recognizes the uneven distribution of power, it is significant that he deals with "the crisis of liberalism" in terms of "adjustment." In the context of Darwinian biology, adjustment or adaptation is conceived as the precondition for survival. Survival in social terms is a rather vague and ambiguous concept. Even if we interpret it as "continued existence," it does not help us to focus the concept more sharply since the meaning of "existence" changes enormously with

the subject on which it is predicated. It is then not surprising that C. Wright Mills notes, "'Adaptations' can easily be stretched to 'getting along,' getting what is desired."[20] Adjustment in Liberalism and Social Action takes place via liberalism whose role is "the mediation of social transitions." In fact, Dewey notes, "the necessity for adjustment defines the office of liberalism."[21] We have to keep in mind here that the use of "liberalism" is ambiguous. Dewey means in this context "the work of intelligence" rather than the political doctrine. But it is by no means always clear how key concepts or terms are employed.

The concept adjustment, once transferred into the social arena which, on Dewey's own account, is characterized by antagonisms and conflicts, implies in reality not what Dewey wanted it to mean, i.e., amelioration of a "troubled situation" for the good of all, but amelioration of that situation in favor of the few in power. If conditions are what Dewey says they are, then he has no rational grounds for believing that those in power would willingly give it up. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear whether Dewey wants such a distribution of power, or whether he takes for granted the existing hierarchical organization of society. Although he sometimes speaks of the alteration of present conditions, we are not given any concrete details of what this would entail politically, economically, and socially. We are mainly referred to the dissemination of the scientific attitude through education.

The brief consideration of the concept of adaptation shows the inadequacy of Dewey's naturalistic attitude when held against the reality of power, and the different structures and forms of political and social institutions.

In concluding this section it is worthwhile to point out that Dewey's examination of traditional epistemologies in the final chapter of the Logic is preceded by the following,

> It does not suffice that a system have a consistent logic of discourse. It must also have a considerable measure of plausibility in application to things of the world if it is to gain and hold adherents. (p. 513)

If we accept that hindsight or history provides one factor in the validation of theory, and if we also apply the criterion of plausibility to Dewey's theory, then it seems that the latter has not done so well. The changes which Dewey envisaged have not come about. Although, methodologically speaking, the theory of (social) inquiry is a considerable advance over traditional positivist social science and idealism in that it emphasizes present empirical reality, the grounding of the theory "in nature" does not allow for an adequate treatment of the institutionalized and bureaucratized human practices themselves which have shaped this reality.

Notes

1. Richard Rorty, "Dewey's Metaphysics," in New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Hanover, NH: The University Press of New England, 1977), pp. 69-70.

2. Charles Frankel, "John Dewey's Social Philosophy," in New Studies, p. 14.

3. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: The Beacon Press, enlarged edition, 1920), pp. 162-163.

4. Ibid., p. 173.

5. John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: Putnams, 1939), pp. 141-142.

6. John Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Foundations of the Unity of Science, Volume II, Number 4 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 42.

7. John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Collier Books, Eighteenth Printing, 1975), p. 88.

8. Frankel, "John Dewey's Social Philosophy," pp. 10-11.

9. Since this section of the paper relies essentially on Chapter XXIV, "Social Inquiry," of John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt & Co., 1939), I have included page numbers in the text rather than footnoting them.

10. Dewey takes great pains to emphasize that he does not wish to be associated with logical positivism. Whether or not there are positivist traces in his theory of inquiry would be well worth investigating, although this cannot be done in the present context.

11. A more extensive treatment of the "problematic situation" is given earlier on in the Logic. See Chapter VI, "The Pattern of Inquiry."

12. Ernest Nagel recounts an episode which makes this opposition quite clear: "I remember one memorable occasion when the late Otto Neurath sought to interest Dewey in the Unity of Science movement, but having him contribute a monograph to the Encyclopedia of Unified Science which Neurath was then planning. I accompanied Neurath and Sidney Hook when they called on Dewey at his home; and Neurath was having obvious difficulty in obtaining Dewey's participation in the Encyclopedia venture. Dewey had one objection . . . to Neurath's invitation. The objection was that since the Logical Positivists subscribed to the belief in atomic facts or atomic propositions, and since Dewey did not think there are such things, he could not readily contribute to the Encyclopedia . . ." As it turned out, he did, in the form of the Theory of Valuation. The anecdote is reprinted in James Rachel's essay, "John Dewey and the Truth about Ethics," in New Studies, pp. 153-154.

13. Cf. his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Second Printing, 1980), especially in Chapter IV, "Privileged Representations," pp. 173-182.

14. Ibid., p. 174.

15. In contemporary social philosophy, the notion of truth as warranted assertibility is employed by the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas. See particularly his book Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heinemann, 1972).

16. Rorty, Mirror, p. 178.

17. Rorty, "Dewey's Metaphysics," p. 60.

18. A brief but excellent explication of this notion in its various implications is given by Charles Taylor in his Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge, London, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

19. Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Putnams, 1935), pp. 63-64.

20. C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 379.

21. Liberalism and Social Action, p. 49.

THE PREMISES OF FOUR MORAL CONCEPTIONS: CLASSIC, MODERN, TOTALITARIAN, AND UTOPIAN: A CRITIQUE OF AFTER VIRTUE BY ALASDAIR MACINTYRE

Raymond Wilkie
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Alasdair MacIntyre's recent and widely acclaimed study of Western moral philosophy, After Virtue (1982), is an integration of ideas and arguments published over several decades in books such as A Short History of Ethics (1966), Secularization and Moral Change (1967), Marxism and Christianity (1968), and Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy (1978). MacIntyre describes his thought as being in the Aristotelian tradition; it is also highly skeptical and analytic.

After Virtue has three related themes. The first theme is that the classic (Aristotelian) conception of the individual, of society, and of their right relation is valid, but that it can and should be based on empirical sociological grounds, rather than on Aristotle's conception of the biological nature of man, a discredited metaphysical assumption in MacIntyre's view. A second theme is that modern moral philosophers in the liberal Enlightenment tradition have attempted to provide alternative rational secular accounts of morality, but that these accounts are invalid because based on the false conception that individuals exist prior to and autonomous of society. A third theme is that the language of morality, and therefore to some large degree its practice, is in a "grave state of disorder" because of changes over time in the meaning of the basic Aristotelian concept of the virtues and related moral concepts. Although this third thesis is well argued and illustrated and may be the most original contribution of the book, it is the first two theses that are the concern of this paper: It is these which make After Virtue an important book for moral and educational philosophy. Whether one agrees with MacIntyre's primary contentions or not, the book restates basic and perennial moral questions in an informed and provocative way that requires a response from both critics and supporters of his modified Aristotelian position.

An alternative way of stating the basic themes of After Virtue is that there are two ways of conceptualizing the individual, the community or society, and their right relationship: the classic or Aristotelian and the modern, which is liberal, individualistic, and (in the 20th Century) bureaucratic. The classic conception is based on two premises: (1) that values, like facts, are either true or false; and (2) that the community and its welfare and values exist prior to the individual and his welfare and values. The modern conception, represented by Western non-Aristotelian moral philosophies, is based on two contrary premises: (1) that values, unlike facts, are neither true nor false; and (2) that the individual and his goals exist prior to and apart from the community and its welfare. After Virtue argues that the classic conception is true and is a necessary condition of social harmony.

Much of the book is an extended description of the classic conception of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, and it criticizes non-Aristotelian moral philosophies based, in MacIntyre's view, on the two false premises of the modern moral conception. For Aristotle, it is the biological nature of man which provides the same telos for all people, hence the same values and virtues which are objectively true facts. For MacIntyre, however, the biological nature of man is replaced by social "practices" which are engaged in for their own sake (not for external rewards) and which cannot exist without basic virtues such as justice, courage, and honesty among practitioners. A practice as defined by MacIntyre is "any coherent and complex form of socially established human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to that form of activity." Examples of "practices" include arts, sciences, games, and crafts. "In the ancient and medieval worlds, it also included the creation and sustaining of human communities--of households, families, cities, and nations" (p. 175).

Virtues are general dispositions that are required by practices. They are "those goods by which our relationships are defined to those other people enganged in common practices. Without a whole range of key virtues, the goods internal to practices are barred to us. We have to accept as necessary components of any practice with internal goods and standards of excellence the virtues of justice, courage, and honesty" (p. 178).

After Virtue has been widely reviewed and highly acclaimed for its style and erudition, even by reviewers who criticize its logic and its pessimistic mood. Two of the most thorough and thoughtful reviews are those by Prakash and Weinstein in Educational Theory and by Benjamin Barber, a political scientist, in the New Republic. Prakash and Weinstein criticize After Virtue on the grounds that MacIntyre's definition of the virtues and of the good life are not objective, certainly not more so than the modern moral conceptions he so strongly criticizes. And he provides no criteria by which to identify objective values or virtues. His conclusion that "the good life is the quest for the good life" hardly qualifies as a single objective anchor in the modern emotivist world. MacIntyre proposes no criterion that transcends cultural differences; therefore, different communities with very different value systems (for example, Periclean Athens and medieval England) can be called classic by his definition. His use of social practices as the basis of virtues is consistent with a thorough-going cultural relativism. A value or virtue is true if everyone in a given culture believes it to be true, and it is required in the social practices of that culture. Only if justice, courage, and honesty (MacIntyre's recurrent examples of virtues) had the same meaning in all classic cultures could the charge of cultural relativism be refuted.

Benjamin Barber's fundamental criticism of After Virtue is that the classic/modern dichotomy, as described by MacIntyre, is Manichaean; it sees no defects in the classic and no merits in the modern. MacIntyre seems to consider the political and civil liberties of modern, liberal philosophy and

society as of no special value, while he considers Aristotle's acceptance of slavery as only a minor flaw in the classic conception. As a consequence of MacIntyre's total rejection of the modern (the liberal) and his pessimism concerning Western civilization, Barber contends that After Virtue has conservative, even reactionary, political implications. Since Western civilization is past the point of no return in its moral conceptions (or lack of them), MacIntyre's only recommendation for action is to emulate the Benedictine monks who, when Rome was disintegrating, "constructed new forms of community within which the moral life could be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness." "If my account of our moral condition is correct," continues MacIntyre, "we ought also to conclude for some time now we too have reached that turning point. What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us" (pp. 244-245).

The criticisms of After Virtue by these two reviewers are well founded, but it is not the intention of this paper to restate or elaborate them; they are well worth reading in the cited references where a more detailed summary of After Virtue will also be found. The focus of this paper will be, rather, on the four basic premises by which MacIntyre defines the classic and the modern, and on showing that combinations of these four premises define not only the classic and modern moral conceptions but also two others that are here called the Totalitarian and Utopian. In addition, two other basic moral premises will be considered. These two additional premises, following the terminology of Martin Buber, will be called the I-Thou and the I-It premises.

The four basic premises identified by MacIntyre, and here given one-word labels, are the following:

1. The Gemeinschaft (or Community) Premise is that the community (or society) and its welfare exists prior to the individual and is more important than the individual or all individuals.

2. The Individualistic (or Social Contract) Premise is that individuals and their basic needs are prior to and more important than the community or society. Society is a system of agreements (a social contract) among individuals, explicit or implicit.

3. The Pluralistic Premise is that values (including virtues) are not objectively true or false. Therefore, no one set of values is objectively better than other sets of values.

4. The Monistic Values Premise is that values (including virtues) are objectively true or false, like facts.

On these four basic premises, MacIntyre contends that the two basic moral concepts of western civilization are based. The classic conception is based on the Gemeinschaft premise and the Monistic Values premise. The modern conception is based on the Individualistic premise and the Pluralistic Values

premise (here called the Totalitarian moral conception). These four moral conceptions correspond roughly to the typology used by Robert Nisbet in a well-known book titled The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thought. Nesbit's category of Political Community corresponds roughly to MacIntyre's modern type; his Religious Community corresponds roughly to MacIntyre's classic type. Nesbit's category of Ecological Community corresponds to what is here called the Utopian type, and is exemplified by the though of Thomas More, St. Benedict, Proudhon, and Prince Kropotkin; his category of Revolutionary Community corresponds to what is here called the Totalitarian type, and is exemplified by the Jacobins of the French Revolution, by Karl Marx, Lenin, Georges Sorel, and Frantz Fanon. Nesbit's typology supports the validity of the fourfold typology presented in this paper.

MacIntyre is a sociologist as well as a social philosopher, and he contends that moral conceptions cannot be meaningfully separated from the societies of which they are a component part. Consequently, his typology of moral conceptions is, at the same time, a typology of societies based on or emphasizing the moral aspect. His distinction between the classic and the modern types of societies corresponds closely to the distinction made by sociologists between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft societies and by anthropologists between Folk and Urban societies. Agreeing with this view, the fourfold typology presented in this paper is a typology of both moral conceptions and of societies.

Each of the basic premises which define the four types of society will be discussed next, together with proposals for modifying them. Following that will be a description of the Utopian and Totalitarian moral conceptions and a discussion of two moral premises which MacIntyre does not explicitly treat, the I-Thou premise and the I-It premise.

The Premises of Four Types of Moral Conceptions and Societies

Society	Classic	Modern	Totalitarian	Utopian
Premise #1	Gemeinschaft	Individualistic	Individualistic	Gemeinschaft
Premise #2	Monistic	Pluralistic	Monistic	Pluralistic

The Gemeinschaft Premise. The premise that the community precedes the individual, both logically and in importance, is a component of the classic moral conception as defined in After Virtue. It is also a component of what is here called the Utopian moral conception. The term Gemeinschaft is used as a label for this premise because the term community has several distinctly different meanings. In MacIntyre's classic society, the community is a system of kin or quasi-kin groups having the characteristics of what the sociologist Ferdinand Toennies called a Gemeinschaft society and what the anthropologist Robert Redfield called a Folk society. Such a society is characterized by the dominance of kinship, by cultural homogeneity, by a relatively small population, and by the importance of the sacred in every aspect of life. Relationships between individuals in a Gemeinschaft kinship system have the following characteristics: (1) Kinship relationships are permanent, life-long; (2) they

are ascribed rather than achieved; (3) they involve rights and responsibilities and privileges; (4) they involve almost every aspect of the culture, economic, political, educational, etc., not merely the regulation of sex and the rearing of children; (5) consequently, people interact as whole persons, not merely in single-function social roles; (6) there is a sense of common destiny; and (7) there are limits to how low a person can sink or high high he can rise in social status or material well-being, since he is closely attached to the entire kinship group; he has a basic right to physical and social existence.

Modern urban society, what Tonnies called a Gesellschaft society, is one in which the dominant relationships are, in every respect, the antithesis of a kinship system.

The Individualistic Premise. The Individualistic premise, which characterizes MacIntyre's modern type of moral conception, states that the individual is logically prior to the "community" and more important. In modern society, however, there is no Gemeinschaft community and so what is meant by this premise is that the individual is prior to the Political State and to the voluntary associations that constitute the individual's primary economic, political, and religious groups. The shift from classic medieval society in Europe to modern democratic-capitalist society based, in theory, on individuals rather than on feudal, quasi-kinship relationships, is represented in political theory by the Social Contract theory of Hobbes and of Rousseau in which the Political State results from the desires and actions of individuals who are assumed to have existed, prior to the State, in a natural or savage condition.

Modern (liberal) society is, in MacIntyre's view, an arena for competition between individuals and interest groups. The purpose of the State is to regulate the competition. The interest groups that represent individuals are not Gemeinschaft kin groups; they are single purpose organizations--business associations, unions, or professions--that are not concerned with their members as whole persons, but only as specific roles. The poor and powerless in modern liberal society generally belong to no such organized interest groups, the wealthy and powerful generally belong to many and control them. Modern liberal society emphasizes economic and political freedom; but economic security for those without property or skills needed by employers is not guaranteed, and there is no Gemeinschaft kinship community to shelter the individual or the nuclear family. The liberal welfare State is one "response" to the absence of the Gemeinschaft community; the modern totalitarian state is another.

The Individualistic premise that the individual is prior to and more important than the society is true only in the sense that with the breakdown of medieval feudalism the Gemeinschaft kinship community was no longer prior to and more important than the individual since it no longer existed. Individualistic premise, more accurately stated, is that in the absence of a Gemeinschaft community the individual is either isolated, alienated, powerless

with no sense of identity or else he identifies with the organized power systems of his society, be they economic corporations or the Nation state, the political party, or the Church. The hyper-individualism of modern society is a thin veneer over a deeper lack of identity for many people, a lack of identification with any Gemeinschaft group that provides permanent and real security. Erich Fromm in his description of Nazi Germany, Escape from Freedom, described a process that is part of every modern liberal society, but which passed the point of no return in Germany as a result of the economic disaster which followed World War I. The totalitarian Nazi State promised the security of a pseudo-community, the party and the State, in exchange for the freedoms of modern liberal society. In the absence of a real Gemeinschaft community, desperate Germans saw the totalitarian Nazi State as a way of finding security in identification with a powerful aggressor; the price was the liberal freedoms which they associated with economic depression and national weakness.

The Monistic (Authoritarian) Values Premise and the Pluralistic Values Premise. The Monistic Values premise, characteristic of the classic moral conception and of classic societies of Athens and medieval Europe, is what values and virtues are objective and empirical facts, which are true or false. The Pluralistic premise, characteristic of the modern moral conception, is that values are not facts, they are not objectively and empirically true or false. These two premises have several limitations. First, the distinction between objective facts and subjective values is post-Aristotelian. It was first given major emphasis by Enlightenment thinkers and was not recognized in classic Athens or medieval Europe. Second, few people in modern society think there is no objective basis for the values they themselves hold. We may tolerate the values of others who do not share our values, but few of us believe that there is no objective evidence for our own values.

In view of these two considerations, it is here proposed that the Monistic and Pluralistic Values premises be stated in terms of toleration rather than in terms of the facts/values distinction. The Monistic or Authoritarian premise so modified is that only one set of values is tolerated in the society; dissenters will be persuaded or eliminated. The Pluralistic premise is that multiple sets of values are tolerated in the community; means will be sought to resolve differences by dialogue and compromise.

The Totalitarian Society and Moral Conception. The Totalitarian society and the Utopian society have both emerged from modern liberal society; each represents an attempt to have the advantages of modern society without some of the defects. The Totalitarian society is characterized by intolerance of value differences and by the absence of primary social groups other than those which function as arms of the State. The individual's primary relationship is to the State. Ideally, he has no obligations to kin, to church, or to other organizations, except as they are arms of the State. Although such a total control is impossible to achieve, it is the intended goal of all Totalitarian states of both the right and left. A major defect of modern liberal society is its instability resulting from economic crises and wars. An important question to be asked about policies designed to remedy such defects is whether

they move society toward the Totalitarian, the Utopian, or the classic. The Monistic Values premise which MacIntyre admires in classic society has a very different meaning in the Totalitarian society. In modern society, moves toward the Monistic premise are more likely toward the Totalitarian than toward the classic because Gemeinschaft kin or quasi-kin communities are powerless in modern society.

The Utopian Society and Moral Conception. The Utopian moral conception is a combination of the Pluralistic (toleration) premise with the Gemeinschaft premise, but the Gemeinschaft group of Utopian society is not necessarily based on blood kinship. It is more often an intentional quasi-kinship group such as an Israeli kibbutz. Historically, both the Utopian and Totalitarian conceptions of society derive from thinkers in modern liberal societies. Utopian societies are attempts to combine the material and psychological security of the Gemeinschaft community with pluralistic toleration of value differences and the use of modern technology. Utopian communities aim at the minimization of bureaucracy and of specialization. They strive for decentralization and self-sufficiency even if this is technologically less efficient or does not maximize profits. The Utopian ideal is democratic in spirit, including material economic aspects of life, but it is not necessarily identified with particular forms of parliamentary or representative democracy. No nation-states have been based on the Utopian conception, but cooperative communes, voluntary collectives like the Israeli kibbutzim, and intentional communities of many kinds have attempted to implement the basic Gemeinschaft and toleration premises. An interesting contemporary example of a shift from the classic type toward the Utopian and the Totalitarian are fundamentally alike, a misconception that seems based on the fact that both differ from the modern liberal in promising economic and psychosocial support to those who are downwardly mobile or without hope in the competitive struggles of modern capitalist society.

The I-Thou and I-It Life Stances

After Virtue argues that the two premises which constitute the classic are true and that the two premises of the modern are false. Even if true, however, the two premises of the classic are insufficient to derive some important aspects of a complete moral conception. Moreover, morality is more than a set of cognitive premises; it is a total stance toward life that includes non-cognitive aspects as well. A set of such moral life-stances that are central in Western civilization are what Martin Buber and others have called the I-Thou and the I-It. The I-It life-stance views people as separate space-time objects in cause-effect relationships. The purposes of I-It relationships are objective power/control and the subjective qualities of experiences. The I-It stance characterizes the stereotypically hyper-masculine and is predominant in politics, economics, war, and other "masculine" activities in which I or "we" (my family, my community, my group, or my society) is in conflict/competition with "them." "They" (the others, the outsiders, our competitors, the enemy) are engaged against "us" in zero-sum games, win-lose

situations, in which "we" benefit to the extent that "they" lose, and vice versa. The I-It attitude toward "others" ranges from indifference (when others are seen as inanimate objects) to paranoia (when others are seen as demonic, the incarnation of Evil). But the underlying perception of the I-It is that individuals and groups are separate objects; the "rational" behavior in such a situation is to attempt to use/control others and to avoid being used/controlled by "them."

The I-Thou life-stance views people as parts of whole families, and communities that are characterized by a sense of oneness, of identification, of "love" in its broadest sense. I-Thou relationships are ends in themselves, not the means to control of others. The I-Thou stance is one that sees and feels a basic unity and oneness in all of humanity and the Universe. It is exemplified by the basic tenets of the world religions such as "All men are brothers" and "Do unto others as you would that they do unto you." In a predominantly I-It society, such as the modern, the loving, universalistic I-Thou stance is found primarily in activities considered "feminine" such as parenting, teaching, helping others, and the aesthetic and spiritual.

In several important ways, the characteristics of the I-Thou are also in the classic society as MacIntyre defines it, because the Gemeinschaft community premise is consistent with the I-Thou. The first similarity is that the individual is identified with the community in both the I-Thou and the classic society; the identification in the classic society is, however, based in part on a sense of alienation from other communities. Secondly, morality and the virtues of character are expressions of the whole person; morality is not merely a matter of conformity to abstract rules or to social roles. Thirdly, the community in both the classic society and in Buber's conception of the I-Thou is sacred. In the classic, sacredness is evidenced and given a concrete rationale by the origin myth of the Heroic Age. In Buber's conception, each I-Thou relationship is an expression of the Eternal I-Thou, which is God.

The classic and the I-Thou moral conceptions are, however, opposed in important ways. First, the I-Thou places infinite value on persons and on I-Thou relationships; it expects, accepts, and prizes differences of values and belief systems. It opposes indoctrination, propaganda, or the use of external threats or rewards in order to achieve uniformity of belief or values. In the classic societies of Athens and medieval Europe, one (Monistic) set of values was assumed to be true and all others in error. The community had the right and the duty to persuade or to coerce those in error to accept "the Truth."

A second difference between the classic and the I-Thou is in the use of persons as objects. The classic societies of Athens and medieval Europe were I-It societies in that persons were used as slaves and serfs, and warfare was glorified for I-It type purposes.

A third difference between the classic and the I-Thou, already described as a difference between the I-It and the I-Thou, is the I-Thou sense of universal oneness/unity and the ethnocentric division of the world by classic societies into "we" and "they."

The classic and the modern moral conceptions and societies are alike in that the I-It is predominant in both. The I-Thou is present in religious and social thought and in families, but it is relegated in both types of society to activities considered by men of power as unimportant, impractical, weak, and "feminine." However, for an adequate typology of moral conceptions in Western society, the I-Thou cannot be omitted as it is in MacIntyre's two moral types. In the typology proposed here, the I-Thou is consistent with, but not required by, the two premises of the Utopian society. A Utopian society could not function with I-Thou activities alone, but I-It activities in such a society would be subordinated to the service of the I-Thou.

Conclusion. This paper proposes a modification and elaboration of the typology of moral conceptions presented in After Virtue. The four premises and two moral conceptions defined by MacIntyre are changed to two moral dimensions (the Gemeinschaft/individualistic and the Pluralistic/Monistic) and four moral conceptions: the modern, the classic, the totalitarian, and the utopian. Two premises that are important in the Western Judeo-Christian moral tradition are the I-Thou and the I-It, defined in essentially the same way by Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant theologians (Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, nd Paul Tillich). The I-It premise (or life-stance) is compatible with both the individualistic premise and the Monistic premise; the I-Thou premise is compatible only with the Gemeinschaft and the pluralistic moral premises that constitute the utopian moral conception. This paper proposes that the basic moral alternatives in the 20th century are not the classic and the modern, but the I-Thou (Utopian) and the I-It (Totalitarian).

If modern, liberal society is to shift toward the I-Thou, then people must consciously commit their work and their lives to the I-Thou. The question: "Knowledge and education for what?" must be answered " For an I-Thou society in which the I-It rational efficiency of science, technology, nd bureaucracy is subordinated to an I-Thou loving identification with one's own community and with all of humanity." Without such a subordination of the I-It to the I-Thou, education in the service of the I-It erodes authentic community and stifles democratic, pluralism, thus furthering the transformation of modern liberal society into Totalitarian society.

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BUSINESS MEETING
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
November 15, 1983
General Custer Room

1. The meeting was called to order by president Keith Raitz at 11:00 a.m., General Custer Room of Holiday Inn, Columbus, Ohio. The minutes were read, amended and approved. The financial statement was approved.

2. Dennis Senchuk, editor of the Proceedings, reported that they were still in process. Typing is being done at Indiana University by the staff utilizing surplus time. He announced that he had sought subscriptions at the P.E.S. meeting. He has placed the Proceedings in the philosophical society list. These activities have not yet produced subscriptions.

3. The nominating committee composed of Dick Pratte, chair, David Denton, and Philip Smith made the following report:

Dennis Senchuk	President Elect
Jack Willers	Executive Committee (1986)
William McKenney	Secretary/Treasurer

The report was moved and passed unanimously.

4. It was announced that Kent State University would host a conference on the philosophy of Michael Polanyi, March 8, 9, 1984. The featured speaker is to be Dr. Harry Broudy. Members of the society are especially invited to attend.

5. It was announced that Dennis Senchuk, because of the pressure of personal work, will find it necessary to relinquish the editorship of the Proceedings. Some discussion followed pertaining to the procedures for obtaining a new editor. It was decided that it was the prerogative of the president to make such appointments. Tim Reagan was appointed editor and Robert Skovira was asked to continue as associate editor.

6. David Denton moved that Dennis Senchuk should receive the gratitude of the Society as outgoing editor. The retiring President should receive a letter of commendation with his chair and dean also receiving copies. Dick Pratte suggested that the incoming president should write the letters. It was suggested that Robert Skovira and his dean should be included in the commendations.

7. A letter from the A.E.S.A. requesting the 1986 meeting of the Society be held jointly with A.E.S.A. at Pittsburgh was read. A long and confusing discussion followed. It was pointed out that the usual program planning by the Society made long-range planning impossible. Fear was expressed that the purposes of the two groups are too different to allow for a joint meeting. Confusion about the concept of "piggy-backing" was expressed. Length of the respective meetings was discussed.

It was moved and passed 8 to 5 that the president or someone acting in his behalf explore the meeting with A.E.S.A. and report the findings to next year's meeting.

Gerald Reagan moved that the President write a letter to Professor Altenbaugh and explain that we do not plan meetings that far in advance, and thank him for his invitation. He also proposed that David Engel should be informed that the Association would accept an invitation to meet in Pittsburgh in 1986. The motion was seconded by Conrad Pritscher. The president then ruled the motion out of order.

Gerald Reagan then moved to reconsider the previous motion. Concern was expressed that the Reagan proposal completely closed the door on the joint meeting. The motion to reconsider passed.

Mr. Reagan's motion was moved again and passed.

8. Robert Skovira proposed that Harry Broudy be declared an honorary member of the Society. It was said by Dick Pratte that there are no precedents for such an action by the Society.

9. It was proposed by William McKenney that the Society begin an institutional membership of $25. For such memberships graduate students from that institution would receive free dues to the Society and the institution would receive copies of the Proceedings.

The motion was amended as follows: The institutional membership fee will be $50. Graduate students from member institutions will receive free registrations for the Society's meetings. The motion passed.

10. Conrad Pritscher, President-elect, asked for the sense of the meeting pertaining to the meeting date for 1984. The date was approximately November 10. It was observed that the early meeting date was reflected in the small number of papers submitted. Approval of a dinner meeting was expressed.

William McKenney, Secretary/Treasurer

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Treasurer's Final Report for 1984

BALANCE: January 5, 1983	812.80
Receipts:	
Interest	59.01
Subscriptions	126.35
General	462.37
Convention	915.00
TOTAL RECEIPTS:	1562.73
Disbursements:	
Supplies	14.80
Copyright	10.00
Postage	112.40
Printing	13.76
Convention	641.76
Clerical	6.70
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS:	799.42
NET BALANCE: January 5, 1984	1576.11

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